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According to many in the bankruptcy field, small business
debtors are increasingly turning to state debtor-creditors laws as
an alternative to federal bankruptcy relief. One particularly
popular state law is the assignment for the benefit of creditors.
The conventional wisdom is that these procedures provide a state
law alternative to liquidate a business.
This article reports the results of an original empirical study
that challenges this conventional wisdom. Gathering data from
every assignment for the benefit of creditors in a major
metropolitan area over a three-year period, this study shows that
debtors and their secured creditors are using these procedures
not just to liquidate a business but also to sell the business as a
going concern, free and clear of interests. These going concern
sales, particularly when sold to insiders of the debtor, are
actually more like corporate reorganization than liquidation.
These findings raise important questions about the role of
these state law alternatives and the way they interact with the
federal bankruptcy laws. These questions, in turn, may help
inform debates about reforming the bankruptcy laws,
particularly as applied to small business debtors.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Small businesses collectively comprise an integral part of the
national economy, whether measured in terms of job creation,
capitalization, or contributions to the gross domestic product., These
businesses are frequently described as the "backbone of America's
economy,"2 and they are credited with replacing the many jobs lost
during the Great Recession.3 But there is a growing concern that one-
1. See KATHRYN KOBE, ECON. CONSULTING SERVS., L.L.C., SMALL BUSINESS GDP:
UPDATE 2002-2010, at 1, 4, https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/rs390totI.pdf; Kelly
Edmiston, Fed. Reserve Bank of Kan. City, The Role of Small and Large Businesses in
Economic Development, 92 ECON. REV. 73, 77-80 (2007), https://www.kansascityfed.org/-/
media/files/publicat/econrev/econrevarchive/2007/2qO7edmi.pdf
2. See e.g., President Barack Obama, Remarks on the Economy at Industrial
Support, Inc., Buffalo, N.Y. (Mar. 13, 2010), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/remarks-president-economy.
3. Jared Hecht, Are Small Businesses Really the Backbone of the Economy, INC. (Dec.
17, 2014), http://www.inc.com/jared-hecht/are-small-businesses-really-the-backbone-of-
the-economy.html (citing 2010 Census Report). But see Jason Wiens & Chris Jackson, The
Importance of Young Firms for Economic Growth, ENTREPRENEURSHIP POL'Y DIG.
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size-fits-all federal regulatory programs are failing to support this
critical sector of the market.4 Some regulations may impose
disproportionately higher costs on small businesses.5 For example, the
cost of compliance with federal securities laws may impede small
businesses from accessing the capital markets.6 Other regulatory
programs may fail to achieve their ends because they lack the flexibility
to address variations in local markets. For example, federal patent laws
arguably fail to promote innovation in the same way that state level
patents would be able to do.7
Federal bankruptcy laws raise both of these concerns. These laws
purport to promote the reorganization of viable businesses, with the
goal of minimizing the costs of business failure on owners, their
creditors, employees, and local communities.8 These policies, in turn,
(Kauffman Found., Kan. City, Mo.), Sept. 25, 2014, at 1, http://www.kauffman.org/-/
media/kauffman-org/resources/2014/entrepreneurship%20policy%20digest/september%
2 0
2014/entrepreneurship-policy-digestseptember2Ol4.pdf (arguing that it new and young
firms are the drivers of job creation, regardless of business size).
4. NICOLE V. CRAIN & W. MARK CRAIN, LAFAYETTE COLL., THE IMPACT OF
REGULATORY COSTS ON SMALL FIRMS 6-11 (2010), https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/
The%20Impact%2Oo/o2oRegulatory%2OCosts%200n%2OSmall%2OFirms%20%28Full%29
.0.pdf; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Legislate in Haste, Repent at Leisure, HOOVER INST.:
HOOVER DIG. (July 30, 2006), http://www.hoover.org/research/legislate-haste-repent-
leisure (discussing disproportionate cost of Sarbanes Oxley compliance borne by smaller
public firms).
5. Bainbridge, supra note 4.
6. David R. Burton, Reducing the Burden on Small Public Companies Would
Promote Innovation, Job Creation, and Economic Growth, HERITAGE FOUND. (June 20,
2014), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2014/06/reducing-the-burden-on-small-
public-companies-would-promote-innovation-job-creation-and-economic-growth; Gary J.
Ross, Small Business Capital Raises: Legal, Practical, and Market Factors, 2015-DEC
BUS. L. TODAY 1, 1-2 (2015), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/
blt/2015/12/capital-raises-201512.authcheckdam.pdf.
7. Camilla A. Hrdy, State Patents as a Solution to Underinvestment in Innovation, 62
U. KAN. L. REV. 487, 488 (2013).
8. See N.L.R.B. v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 514, 527 (1984) ("[T]he policy of
Chapter 11 is to permit successful rehabilitation of debtors . . . ."); Matthew Bruckner,
The Virtue in Bankruptcy, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 233, 275 (2013) [hereinafter Bruckner, The
Virtue] ("Chapter 11 is biased toward the rehabilitation of financially distressed
companies and their reorganization into viable, going concerns."); Nathalie D. Martin,
Noneconomic Interests in Bankruptcy: Standing on the Outside Looking In, 59 OHIO ST.
L.J. 429, 439 (1998) ("Chapter 11's rehabilitative goals run not merely to the reorganizing
company, its creditors, and shareholders, but also to third party interests."); Elizabeth
Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World, 92 MICH. L. REV. 336, 343-44
(1993) ("The [bankruptcy] system aims ... toward four principal goals: (1) to enhance the
value of the failing debtor; (2) to distribute value according to multiple normative
principles; (3) to internalize the costs of the business failure to the parties dealing with
the debtor; and (4) to create reliance on private monitoring.").
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play an important role in encouraging and facilitating innovation and
entrepreneurship.9 Entrepreneurs, it has been noted, may start
multiple businesses over the course of their professional careers only to
see many or most of them fail-that is, these owners are "serial
entrepreneurs."o This serial entrepreneurship cycle requires a
regulatory program to balance the risks of business failures, allowing
entrepreneurs to save viable businesses or walk away from nonviable
ones, while at the same time protecting creditors that invest in these
ventures.11
Bankruptcy law, in theory, serves this function, permitting viable
but financially distressed businesses to reorganize their liabilities while
liquidating nonviable businesses.12 But, bankruptcy law has been
criticized as providing ineffective relief for small businesses.13 First,
bankruptcy is expensive, and for small and medium-sized enterprises, it
may simply be cost-prohibitive.14 Second, the small-business-specific
bankruptcy laws raise the costs of bankruptcy and limit its
effectiveness.15 Small businesses face higher reporting requirements,
9. See generally Douglas G. Baird & Edward R. Morrison, Serial Entrepreneurs and
Small Business Bankruptcies, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2310 (2005) (considering whether
bankruptcy law, as currently constructed actually facilitates entrepreneurship). See also
Wei Fan & Michelle J. White, Personal Bankruptcy and the Level of Entrepreneurial
Activity, 46 J.L. & ECON. 543, 544 (2003), and John Armour & Douglas Cumming,
Bankruptcy Law and Entrepreneurship, 10 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 303, 337 (2008), which
both identify the role of personal bankruptcy relief as a predictor of entrepreneurship
rates.
10. Baird & Morrison, supra note 9, at 2329 ("Many small businesses fail each year.
Indeed, over 30% of new startups close within two years; over 50% close within four
years.").
11. Id. (arguing that Chapter 11 currently creates an incentive for owner-operators to
stay with a failed ventured and that the reorganization law needs to be re-thought in
order to better support serial entrepreneurship).
12. See Alan Schwartz, A Normative Theory of Business Bankruptcy, 91 VA. L. REV.
1199, 1200-01 (2005) (describing the former as "financial distress" and the latter as
"economic distress," and positing that "[s]ocial welfare is maximized when economically
distressed firms are liquidated but financially distressed firms are continued").
13. See infra notes 14-21.
14. See Matthew Adam Bruckner, Crowdsourcing (Bankruptcy) Fee Control, 46 SETON
HALL L. REV. 361, 365-94 (2016) (discussing general concern that bankruptcy may be too
expensive); see also D.J. BAKER ET AL., AM. BANKR. INST., FINAL REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 277 n.985 (2014), https://abiworld.app.box.com/s/vvircv5xv83aavl4
dp4h (noting the particular impact of high cost of bankruptcy on small businesses).
15. Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Success of Chapter 11: A
Challenge to the Critics, 107 MICH. L. REV. 603, 638 (2009) ("[T]he new small business
provisions imposed inflexible deadlines and several other burdens on Chapter 11
businesses with less than $2 million in debt." (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(51D), 1121(e)
(2012))).
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and they enjoy less flexibility in the plan confirmation process.16 And
third, the bankruptcy confirmation requirements may impose a
particularly high cost on owner-operators.17 Under the absolute priority
rule, a business owner cannot retain her equity interest in the debtor
unless all creditors consent or are paid in full.18 This imposes a risk for
business owners in all cases, but particularly so on owner-operators
whose interest in their company is likely their primary source of
income.19
Without an effective bankruptcy law for small businesses, there is a
fear that small businesses may lack the ability to reorganize and
thereby preserve going concern value for creditors and investors alike.20
If these businesses cannot reach a consensual workout plan with their
creditors, they may be forced to liquidate.21 This concern about federal
bankruptcy law's ineffectiveness for small business debtors has
prompted a number of proposals to amend the bankruptcy laws as
applied to small- and medium-sized enterprises.22 Such amendments
are perceived as necessary because bankruptcy alone offers many of the
powers necessary for a successful reorganization, for example, including
the power
to decide unilaterally (for the most part) to assume or reject
contracts and leases, to obtain financing that primes existing
liens (thus providing a source of capital not available outside of
bankruptcy), to sell some or all of its assets free and clear of all
liens and claims, and to delay the payment of and restructure
its prepetition obligations while continuing to operate the
16. See id. at 638-39.
17. Donald R. Korobkin, Vulnerability, Survival, and the Problem of Small Business
Bankruptcy, 23 CAP. U. L. REV. 413, 425-26 (1994) (describing the impact of the "absolute
priority rule" on small businesses).
18. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B). Although this statute nowhere uses the word "absolute
priority rule," this is the term of art described in this provision. See Anthony J. Casey,
The Creditors'Bargain and Option-Preservation Priority in Chapter 11, 78 U. CHI. L. REV.
759, 763 n.16 (2011) (briefly summarizing the rule and collecting and synthesizing the
vast literature on this provision).
19. Korobkin, supra note 17, at 425.
20. Michelle M. Harner, Are Small- and Medium-Sized Companies Worth Saving?, 34
AM. BANKR. INST. J. 8, 8-9 (July 2015) (expressing concern that bankruptcy may be
practically unavailable to small and medium enterprises and that state laws may not
provide an opportunity to reorganize failing businesses).
21. Id.
22. The most recent proposal is that of the ABI Commission to Study the Reform of
Chapter 11, see supra note 14. See generally Anne Lawton, An Argument for Simplifying
the Code's "Small Business Debtor"Definition, 21 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 55 (2013).
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This article reports the results of an original empirical study that
challenges this conventional wisdom, showing that debtors were able to
use state law to reorganize without the need of federal bankruptcy
protection. This study examines one particular state debtor-creditor
law, the assignment for the benefit of creditors (ABC), in South Florida
over a three-year period, from 2012 to 2014.24 Data gathered from court
filings in these ABC cases shows that businesses-in particular, but not
limited to, small- and medium-sized enterprises-are using this state
law procedure to reorganize. Debtors were able to do so using tools
generally thought to be bankruptcy-specific: rejecting contracts,
obtaining post-petition financing, and selling assets free and clear of
interests.25
While prior studies on ABCs have examined the availability and
popularity of ABCs as a liquidation option,26 this study shows that
ABCs may be used to permit business owners to retain their equity
interests and restructure their liabilities. These findings raise
important legal, systemic, and empirical questions about the interaction
of state debtor-creditor laws and the federal Bankruptcy Code. They
may also provide an important perspective on efforts to reform the
23. Michelle M. Harner & Jamie Marincic Griffin, Facilitating Successful Failures, 66
FLA. L. REV. 205, 210 n.11 (2014) (listing these as example of the "tools not otherwise
available outside of bankruptcy"); see also William Choslovsky & Eric Walker, DLA Piper,
An Alternative to Bankruptcy: The ABCs of ABCs, in THE AMERICAS RESTRUCTURING AND
INSOLVENCY GUIDE 2008/2009, at 90, 92-93 (2008),
http://www.americasrestructuring.com/08_SF/p90-95%2OAn%20alternative%20to%20
bankruptcy.pdf ("ABCs are not limited to liquidations. Just as in bankruptcy, an ABC can
be used to facilitate a going-concern sale of the debtor's assets to a third party. However,
an ABC does not provide for the reorganisation of a troubled business, as that relief is
provided exclusively by Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Furthermore, only corporate
entities, not individuals or sole proprietors, are eligible to commence an ABC.").
24. As explained infra, South Florida consists of the tri-county metropolitan area of
Miami-Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach counties. The Office of Management and Budget
identifies Miami-Fort Lauderdale-West Palm Beach as a single "metropolitan area," see
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB BULL. NO. 15-10,
REVISED DELINEATIONS OF METROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREAS, MICROPOLITAN
STATISTICAL AREAS, AND COMBINED STATISTICAL AREAS, AND GUIDANCE ON USES OF THE
DELINEATIONS OF THESE AREAS 41 (2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
omb/bulletins/2015/15-01.pdf, and these three counties are the largest of the nine counties
in the United States District for the Southern District of Florida.
25. Harner & Griffin, supra note 23, at 218-21.
26. See generally Ronald Mann, An Empirical Investigation of Liquidation Choices of
Failed High Tech Firms, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 1375 (2004) [hereinafter Mann, Liquidation
Choices]; Edward R. Morrison, Bargaining Around Bankruptcy: Small Business Workouts
and State Law, 38 J. LEGAL STUDIES 255 (2009). Both are discussed in Part II, infra.
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corporate bankruptcy laws, particularly as applied to small and
medium enterprises.
This article begins by providing a background on ABCs. Part I
describes ABCs generally and then examines Florida's ABC statute in
particular. It then summarizes previous studies on ABCs, which have
largely focused on ABCs as a liquidation alternative. As explained in
this part, this project is the first of its kind to report data on actual ABC
proceedings, a feat made possible because Florida's procedures are
conducted through state courts, whereas other state systems are
conducted extra-judicially.
Part II describes the study design and data collection methodology,
and Part III presents the findings. The findings are broken down into
three sections. The first reports the case outcomes, categorizing each
case as either a liquidation or a going concern sale. The going concern
sales are then categorized as sales to former insiders of the assignor or
to third parties. The second section presents findings as to distributions
made to creditors. And the third presents data on how these cases
interacted with the bankruptcy laws, reporting examples of cases in
which creditors commenced an involuntary bankruptcy proceeding
against the debtor and in which the assignee was able to use the
bankruptcy laws to supplement its statutory powers.
Part IV then examines the implications of these findings. It first
examines the legal questions that arise from having a dual system of
bankruptcy relief. Namely, to what extent do the Constitution and the
federal bankruptcy laws leave room for states to legislate in this field?
The Contracts Clause prohibits state from enacting laws that impair
the obligation of contracts, and the Supremacy Clause would preempt
any state laws that conflict with the federal Bankruptcy Code. 27 While
the Supreme Court has found the federal bankruptcy laws preempt
state "insolvency" laws, state ABC laws have largely survived
preemption challenges..28 But the more these ABC law approximate
federal bankruptcy law, the more likely they may conflict with those
federal laws.29 There is very little guidance in this field, and the Court
27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 ("No State shall ... pass any ... Law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts . . . ."); id. art. VI, cl 2. ("This Constitution and the Laws of the
United States .. . shall be the supreme Law of the Land. . .
28. See infra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
29. This issue arose in the litigation concerning the Puerto Rico Public Corporation
Debt Enforcement and Recovery Act ("Recovery Act"), which purported to grant
bankruptcy-type relief to Puerto Rican public corporations. The First Circuit Court of
Appeals held the Recovery Act preempted, both explicitly and under principles of conflict
preemption. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr. v. Puerto Rico, 805 F.3d 322, 343 (1st Cir.), cert.
granted, 136 S. Ct. 582 (2015), cert. granted sub nom. Acosta-Febo v. Franklin Cal. Tax-
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has declined to define the scope of Congress's bankruptcy power.so But
if ABCs continue to be used as bankruptcy reorganization alternatives,
it is likely that courts will soon have to address the constitutionality of
these state law alternatives to bankruptcy.
It then proceeds to consider the systemic costs and benefits of
having state law alternatives to bankruptcy. State law alternatives
might permit states to support financially distressed small businesses;
however, they may come at the expense of increasing the cost of credit
to the extent they are too debtor-friendly.31
Next, this section highlights some of the empirical questions raised
by these findings. To the extent that business owners may be able to
reorganize their business under state law-without the attendant costs,
stigma, and legal challenges-this would help explain our
understanding of bankruptcy outcomes. We know that small businesses
fare poorly in chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, and we have
understood this "failure" to be a function of the bankruptcy laws-in
particular those that apply to "small business debtors."32 But these
findings suggest the possibility that these observations may reflect a
selection bias: viable business debtors may be using ABCs, leaving non-
viable debtors to file bankruptcy. Or it may be that debtors are using
ABCs as a first measure to address financial problems before turning to
bankruptcy law as a last resort.33
Finally, this section considers how these findings may inform
current efforts to reform the business bankruptcy laws, particularly as
to small and medium enterprises. In many ways, state legislatures have
Free Tr., 136 S. Ct. 582 (2015). The Supreme Court affirmed, but only on explicit
preemption grounds. Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr., 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1949
(2016).
30. See infra notes 56-60.
31. See infra Section IV.B.2.
32. The "success" reported here is based solely on the ability of debtors to retain their
business while effectively discharging their debts. "Success" could also be measured over a
longer time frame by looking at whether the reorganized debtor remained in operation.
Many bankruptcy studies have measured success in both ways. See, e.g., Anne Lawton,
Chapter 11 Triage: Diagnosing a Debtor's Prospects for Success, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 985,
1001-04 (2012) [hereinafter Lawton, Chapter 11 Triage] (defining a bankruptcy case as a
"success" if "the bankruptcy court did not convert or dismiss the case post-confirmation,
and the debtor did not subsequently re-file for bankruptcy under any chapter of the
Code"); Lynn M. LoPucki & Sara D. Kalin, The Failure of Public Company Bankruptcies
in Delaware and New York: Empirical Evidence of A "Race to the Bottom", 54 VAND. L.
REV. 231, 235 (2001) (measuring re-filing rates of large corporate debtors). This current
study, though, has no data on this longer term success.
33. The findings in this paper do not address these questions; rather, they identify
these as matters for future empirical studies.
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created ABCs as a bankruptcy alternative, consciously crafting the law
to compete with bankruptcy laws. Federal bankruptcy law may be
informed by these state law efforts, in particular, as related to the
ability of business owners to retain their equity interests. Further, to
the extent these ABCs may give too much power to debtors, these
findings may support providing greater protections to creditors.
I. BACKGROUND
Assignments for the benefit of creditors have been a core platform of
debtor-creditor laws dating back to English common law.34 This section
begins with a brief background on ABC laws, proceeds to discuss ABC
laws in Florida, and concludes by summarizing prior empirical studies
on ABCs.
A. General Assignments for the Benefit of Creditors
The assignment for the benefit of creditors has its roots, doctrinally,
in trust law: a debtor assigns its assets to an assignee to liquidate for
the benefit of creditors.35 The assignee is a fiduciary of the creditors,
and may fulfill her obligations to creditors by liquidating the assets in
the manner most likely to yield the highest returns.36 This may involve
selling the assets piecemeal or by selling all of the assets together.
Originally, ABCs were governed by state common law.37 During the
late 1800s, many states codified their ABC procedures, largely as a
response to concerns that ABCs were being abused.38 Under the
34. Brashear v. West, 32 U.S. 608 (1833) ("[T]he right to make [an assignment]
results from the absolute ownership which every man claims over that which is his own. .
35. Melvin G. Shimm, The Impact of State Law on Bankruptcy, 1971 DUKE L.J. 879,
888 (1971). Technically, the assignor transfers only those assets that are not exempted
from creditor collection-that is, all non-exempt assets. State exemption laws, though,
apply only to individual debtors, not to businesses.
36. GEOFFREY L. BERMAN, AM. BANKR. INST., GENERAL ASSIGNMENTS FOR THE
BENEFIT OF CREDITORS: THE ABCS OF ABCs 4 (David Gould ed., 3d ed. 2015) (2000).
37. See Benjamin Weintraub et al., Assignments for the Benefit of Creditors and
Competitive Systems for Liquidation of Insolvent Estates, 39 CORNELL L.Q. 3, 6 (1953).
38. Id. at 7 (describing the "abusive" uses of common law ABCs - such as partial
assignments, preferential payments, using assignments to demand releases from
consenting creditors - that led to the late nineteenth century statutory revisions of these
procedures); see also Shimm, supra note 35, at 889 (noting that ABCs traditionally were
prone to abuse because the debtor had discretion to "prefer certain of his creditors and
exclude others, conditional participation upon release by creditors of the unpaid balance
of their claims against him, and endow a friendly assignee with broad latitude in the
administration of the assignment").
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common law, debtors could assign their assets (or even a portion of
their assets) to any assignee of their choosing, and the assignee had
broad discretion in how to administer the assets and distribute the
proceeds.39 This process, it was feared, provided insufficient safeguards
to creditors against the debtor's fraudulent and preferential transfers of
assets.40 Statutory reform, it was thought, would rein in these abuses
while retaining the basic structure of ABCs as an efficient creditor
collection device.41
Eleven states continue to rely on common law assignments.42 As for
the others, some states have attempted to modernize their ABC
statutes, while others continue to work largely within the same
structure as those late nineteenth century statutes. For example, as
discussed in the following section, Florida enacted its first ABC statute
in 1889.43 That statute remained intact until 1987, when the Business
Section of the Florida Bar sponsored an overhaul of the statute.44
Regardless of whether an ABC is governed by common law or
statute, ABCs have the same basic structure: assets are transferred to
an assignee, who then administers the assets and distributes the
proceedings according to state law creditor priorities.45 In many ways,
this process resembles that of a liquidation under chapter 7 of the
Bankruptcy Code, with the assignee doing the work of a bankruptcy
trustee.46 For purposes of this discussion, though, there are two
important differences between an ABC and bankruptcy liquidation.
First, the assignor-assignee relationship is consensual, in that a
business owner can choose her assignee and the assignee is free to
accept or refuse the assignment.47 In contrast, in bankruptcy, the
United States Trustee's office appoints a disinterested trustee to
administer the estate.48 This difference is the foundation of the
39. Weintraub et al., supra note 37, at 7.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Carly Landon, Note, Making Assignments for the Benefit of Creditors as Easy as
A-B-C, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1451, 1472 (2014).
43. Jodi Daniel Cooke, Recent Amendments to Ch. 727 Will Streamline Various
Aspects of Assignments for the Benefit of Creditors, 87-AUG FLA. B.J. 34, 34 (2013);
Jeffrey Davis, Florida's Beefed-Up Assignment for the Benefit of Creditors as an
Alternative to Bankruptcy, 19 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 17, 19 (2008).
44. Davis, supra note 43, at 19.
45. BERMAN, supra note 36, at 3-6 (describing basic procedure of ABCs).
46. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-84 (2012).
47. See BERMAN, supra note 36, at 4.
48. 11 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1) ("Promptly after the order for relief under this chapter, the
United States trustee shall appoint one disinterested person that is a member of the
panel of private trustees . . . ."). Non-insider creditors can vote to replace the appointed
146
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historical concerns with ABCs, as these procedures were seen as giving
debtors too much control at the expense of creditors.49
The second important difference is that, unlike in bankruptcy, the
commencement of an ABC does not enjoin creditor collection. A
bankruptcy filing automatically gives rise to one of the broadest
injunctions available, enjoining collection activities against both the
person and property of the debtor.so Under an ABC, there is no
automatic stay against creditor collection.51 Creditors may continue to
attempt to collect on their debts against the debtor's person and
property; however, creditors are practically frustrated from collecting
against the debtor's property, as state law gives the assignee priority
over levying creditors.52 Thus, creditors with a prior perfected security
interest may still foreclose against their collateral; however, unsecured
creditors will be unable to collect on the post-assignment assets.53
Unsecured creditors, although effectively barred from collecting on their
claims post-assignment, may commence an involuntary bankruptcy
petition.54 The bankruptcy laws provide that, within 120 days of an
assignment, creditors may file an involuntary bankruptcy petition that,
if accepted, would remove the case to federal bankruptcy court.55
While these differences have some important implications, as
discussed further infra, the basic structures and functions of ABCs and
trustee under § 702. Id. § 702(a)(3).
49. Weintraub, supra note 37, at 7.
50. 11 U.S.C. § 362; 3-362 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 362.03 (16th ed., 2009) ("The
stay of section 362 is extremely broad in scope and, aside from the limited exceptions of
subsection (b), applies to almost any type of formal or informal action taken against the
debtor or the property of the estate.") (listing cases).
51. BERMAN, supra note 36, at 5.
52. U.C.C. § 9-309(12) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1987) (providing for
automatic perfection of a security interest upon an assignment for the benefit of
creditors"); see also BERMAN, supra note 36, at 5.
53. BERMAN, supra note 36, at 5 (noting that ABC laws themselves may stop such
collection activities, e.g. Florida Statute 727.105 prohibits unsecured creditors from trying
to seize assets in the possession of the assignee; or general state laws may effectively
enjoin such actions by giving the assignee an interest in the assigned goods superior to
any interest an unsecured creditor may attain by levying on the goods. For example,
section 9-309 of the Uniform Commercial Code grants priority to assignee over lien
creditors). Likewise, this holds true in common law ABC jurisdictions, such as Illinois. See
3 ILL. LAW AND PRAc. ASSIGNMENTS FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS § 29 ("Liens existing on
the property of the assignor at the time an assignment for the benefit of creditors becomes
effective are superior to the assignment.").
54. 11 U.S.C. § 303(a).
55. Id. § 303(h). As discussed infra, there are some costs to doing this, e.g., unless
there are fewer than twelve total creditors, an involuntary petition can be commenced
only by at least three creditors. Id. § 303(b).
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bankruptcy are so similar that ABCs enjoy an uncertain co-existence
with federal bankruptcy laws. The Marshall Court recognized that, in
the absence of federal bankruptcy laws, the states retained the right to
pass their own bankruptcy laws, provided those laws did not
unconstitutionally impair the obligation of contracts.5 6 Thus, states
could pass bankruptcy laws but those laws could not discharge prior
incurred debts; rather, they could only discharge debts incurred after
that bankruptcy law's enactment.57 Once a federal bankruptcy law was
in place, that law would "suspend" all conflicting state laws within its
scope.55 The federal bankruptcy laws, then, have preempted state
insolvency laws, but their impact on ABCs has been uncertain.59 The
Court has held that the bankruptcy laws will preempt any ABCs to the
extent those laws purport to discharge debts; however, otherwise ABCs
may coexist.60
The unavailability of a debt discharge in ABCs makes the process
unattractive for individuals and partnerships, as they would remain
saddled with their old debts after the ABC unless creditors otherwise
released their claims; however, for limited liability entities, the
discharge of indebtedness is unimportant. Owners of a limited liability
entity may simply dispose of corporate assets and abandon the empty
corporate shell. Thus, the lack of a discharge is not significant for a
corporate debtor. In fact, corporate debtors do not receive a discharge
even under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code.61
ABCs, then, continue to play a role in debtor-creditor relations for
corporations and other limited liability entities - but the exact extent of
that role has been unclear. The conventional wisdom is that ABCs serve
as a liquidation device, similar to that of a liquidating bankruptcy or a
state law receivership. Under this common view, ABCs are simply an
alternative to bankruptcy liquidation, under chapter 7 of the
56. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. 122, 195 (1819).
57. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 213, 356-57 (1827).
58. Sturges, 17 U.S. at 196 ("If the right of the states to pass a bankrupt law is not
taken away by the mere grant of that power to congress, it cannot be extinguished; it can
only be suspended, by the enactment of a general bankrupt law.").
59. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261, 265 (1929) (declaring unconstitutional an
Arkansas insolvency statute).
60. Pobreselo v. Joseph M. Boyd Co., 287 U.S. 518, 525-26 (1933) (upholding a
Wisconsin assignment law that, even though similar to bankruptcy law in some ways,
was 'quite in harmony with the purposes of the federal [bankruptcy] act'). But see
Sherwood Partners, Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 394 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that portion
of California's ABC statute preempted to the extent it would conflict with bankruptcy's
distribution scheme).
61. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(1) (2012) (making discharge available only to individuals); id. §
1141(d)(3) (denying a discharge to corporate debtors that liquidate under chapter 11).
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Bankruptcy Code.62 The availability of this alternative prompts the
question as to how debtors and their creditors choose which liquidation
device to pursue.
B. Florida Law
Florida is considered to be among the handful of states in which
ABCs are regularly used to address debtor-creditor relations, along with
California and Illinois.63 Substantively, Florida law is not unusual: as
with most states, the debtor assigns all non-exempt assets to an
assignee of its choosing;64 notice is sent to all creditors;e5 creditors file
claims with the assignee;66 the assignee is authorized to liquidate the
assets;67 and then the liquidation proceeds are distributed to those
creditors that filed claims.68 Procedurally, though, Florida is distinctive
in some important ways.
Unlike many states, Florida's ABC process is administered through
the courts from beginning to end.69 This court-centered process differs
greatly from other states, in which a court is involved only to the extent
there is a dispute.70 Under the Florida statute, a case is commenced by
filing a petition for assignment with the court, attaching schedules of
assets and liabilities.71 Within thirty days, the assignee must examine
the assignor "under oath, concerning the acts, conduct, assets,
62. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-784. It is possible, of course, to liquidate a business under
chapter 11 as well. Chapter 11 process differs in that the debtor may administer the
estate and propose a liquidation plan, which must then be approved by the creditors. Id.
§§ 1123, 1129
63. Landon, supra note 42, at 1453.
64. See FLA. STAT. § 727.103(1) (2015) (defining "asset" to exclude "property exempt
by law from forced sale"); id. § 727.103(2) (requiring only that the assignee not be a
creditor, equity security holder, or have "any interest adverse to the interest of the
estate."); see, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1800-02 (West 2007); S. Side Bank & Tr. Co.
v. Yorke, 305 N.E.2d 367, 370-71 (Ill. 1973).
65. FLA. STAT. § 727.111.
66. Id. § 727.112.
67. Id. § 727.108.
68. Id. § 727.114.
69. Id. § 727.102.
70. See Landon, supra note 42, at 1472 ("Because a common law ABC is usually an
out-of-court process, many courts will only see ABCs in these states when and if disputes
occur.").
71. FLA. STAT. § 727.104(c) ("The assignment shall have annexed thereto as Schedule
A a true list of all of the assignor's known creditors, their mailing addresses, the amount
and nature of their claims, and whether their claims are disputed; and as Schedule B a
true list of all assets of the estate, including the estimated liquidation value of the assets,
their location, and, if real property, a legal description thereof, as of the date of the
assignment.").
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liabilities, and financial condition of the assignor or any matter related
to the assignee's administration of the estate."72 The assignee then
administers the estate, with many of the same powers and
responsibilities as those of a bankruptcy trustee.73 For example, the
assignee may hire professionals, evaluate claims against the estate,
reject unexpired leases, and liquidate assets.74 Finally, the assignee is
required to file a final report with the court, detailing the distributions
made to creditors and seeking a final order to close the case.75
The Florida procedures are remarkable not only because they are
judicially administered, but also because the procedures are similar to
bankruptcy procedures. Florida's most recent round of amendments
were partially in response to the 2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention
and Consumer Protection Act, which made bankruptcy relief more
expensive and inaccessible for "small business debtors."76 Florida's ABC
amendments in 2007, 2008, and 2013,77 in many ways sought to
streamline the ABC process and to make its procedures more
bankruptcy-like, making it an attractive and viable alternative to
federal bankruptcy relief.78 For example, Florida extended the amount
of time the assignee could presumptively operate the business during
the assignment in order to give assignees more flexibility in
determining how to maximize the estate's value.79 Florida also gave
greater flexibility and power to assignees by adopting a "negative
notice" procedure.so An assignee is generally obligated to provide notice
to creditors regarding the administration of the estate - including, for
example, notice of asset sales, notice of intent to operate the business,
notice to abandon assets to the secured creditors, etc.8 ' Under the old
procedures, the assignee' could sell the assets only after notice and a
hearing.82 Under the negative notice provisions, if there are no
72. Id. § 727.107(3).
73. Id. § 727.108; see also 11 U.S.C. § 341 (2012).
74. FLA. STAT. § 727.108.
75. Id. § 727.107.
76. Robert M. Lawless, Small Business and the 2005 Bankruptcy Law: Should Mom
and Apple Pie Be Worried?, 31 S. ILL. U. L.J. 585, 615-18 (2007) (describing the potential
impact of these amendments on small businesses); Davis, supra note 43, at 19 (noting
that the Florida ABC amendments were, in part, a response to these 2005 bankruptcy
amendments).
77. Davis, supra note 43, at 19; see also H.R. 833, 2013 Leg. (Fla. 2013),
https://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2013/0833/BillText/Filed/PDF.
78. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
79. Cooke, supra note 23.
80. Id.
81. FLA. STAT. § 727.108(3) (2015).
82. Cooke, supra note 23.
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objections to the assignee's motion, the assignee is empowered to
perform in accordance with the motion without a hearing and without
further court order.83
C. Prior Empirical Work
Florida's court-administered procedures have made it possible for
this study to be the first to contribute case-level data on ABC
proceedings. Prior to this study, there have been two significant
empirical studies on the use of ABCs as a liquidation alternative, both
of which have sought to identify factors that predict this
ABC/bankruptcy option. The first study, conducted by Ronald Mann,
examined high tech firms' use of ABCs as an alternative to liquidating a
company in bankruptcy.84 Mann examined failed enterprises in this
industry to determine factors that drove the firms to select ABC laws
instead of federal bankruptcy law, and developed three theories: first,
debtors are more likely to elect bankruptcy law when that law will
provide unique tools for bargaining with creditors, such as, the power to
reject unfavorable leases and cap the lessor's damages;85 second,
debtors may choose bankruptcy law because of it offers a powerful and
efficient way of recovering pre-bankruptcy transfers;86 and third,
debtors may be more likely to choose ABCs when those processes
impose relatively lower costs than bankruptcy. Thus, he posits that
bankruptcy provides little benefit for debtors in the software industry,
as those debtors' primary concern will be to retain their licensing rights
to practice others' intellectual property; however, bankruptcy provides
no assistance in this regard.87 Another industry-specific feature relates
to their corporate structure. In venture-capital-funded firms, board
members may prefer ABCs since board members in publicly traded
firms must disclose involvement in "bankruptcies," which, according to
some, would not include ABCs.88 That is, in some industries, the
83. FLA. STAT. § 727.111(4) ("If no objections are timely filed and served, the assignee
may take such action as described in the notice without further order of the court or may
obtain an order approving the action without further notice of hearing. If an objection is
filed, the court shall hold a hearing on the objection.").
84. See sources cited supra note 26.
85. Mann, supra note 26, at 1425.
86. Id. at 1436-37.
87. Id. at 1437.
88. Id. at 1424 n.153 (reporting interviewees' touting this benefit); see also BERMAN,
supra note 36, at 6-7 (identifying this same factor, noting that "[t]he making of an
assignment is not generally considered a bankruptcy and therefore may not be subject to
reporting.") The regulation in question is Item 401(0(1) of Regulation S-K, requiring
disclosure of a director's involvement in "[a] petition under the Federal bankruptcy laws
RUTGERS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:137
benefits of bankruptcy may seldom outweigh their costs. Based on this
interaction, Mann concludes that ABCs may lower the costs of financial
distress.89
The second study, conducted by Edward Morrison, examined the
liquidation choices of small business debtors in Chicago.90 Morrison
posits that the attractiveness of ABCs arises, in part, from the
relationship between the owner-operator and its senior lenders.91 He
concludes that a "distressed small business will . . . opt for state
procedures if its owner-manager and senior lenders can agree on a
division of the surplus generated by state procedures."92 If they can't
agree-which he suggests may be the result of a lack of trust between
the two parties-then lenders may prefer bankruptcy.93 Bankruptcy, in
that context, serves a verification function.94 In bankruptcy, the debtor
will have to disclose its assets and liabilities and will be subject to court
oversight (and potentially oversight by a court-appointed examiner or
trustee), thus providing a creditor with greater information than would
be attainable otherwise.95
These studies have been foundational in understanding the
interaction of federal and state liquidation options; however, neither
one has examined how debtors have used ABCs. Morrison's study
identifies the possibility that some debtors may be using ABCs in order
to reorganize instead of liquidate, but, due largely to data constraints,
neither study examines this possibility. Data regarding ABCs are
simply hard to find, as in California and Illinois the process is extra-
judicial.96
The conventional wisdom is that ABCs would not be an option for
debtors looking to reorganize. ABCs, it is thought, cannot provide some
of key features thought necessary to reorganize a debtor.97 In part,
or any state insolvency law." Mann, supra note 26, at 1424 n.153 (citing 17 C.F.R. §
229.401(f)(1)). Like Professor Mann, I remain unconvinced that the SEC disclosure rules
are so rigid as to be so easily evaded.
89. Mann, supra note 26, at 1417.
90. Morrison, Bargaining Around Bankruptcy, supra note 26, at 257-58.
91. Id. at 257.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 270.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Cf. FLA. STAT. § 727.102 (2015).
97. Choslovsky & Walker, supra note 23, at 92 ("ABCs are not limited to liquidations.
Just as in bankruptcy, an ABC can be used to facilitate a going-concern sale of the
debtor's assets to a third party. However, an ABC does not provide for the reorganisation
of a troubled business, as that relief is provided exclusively by Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code. Furthermore, only corporate entities, not individuals or sole
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ABCs may be too limited geographically, unable to administer out-of-
state assets or bind out-of-state creditors.98 Only a federal bankruptcy
law could provide truly national relief. Further, ABCs are understood to
be limited in the relief they can offer.99 For example, powers such as the
ability to assume or reject executory contracts and leases, to obtain
reorganization financing that can take priority over existing liens, and
to sell assets free and clear of liens are all commonly understood as
available only under the bankruptcy option.100
The study reported here seeks to promote a more complete
understanding of the ABC option, examining the results debtors have
been able to obtain under these state law proceedings. The findings
reported below challenge many of these common presumptions about
the limited scope of relief available under ABCs, and they raise
important questions about the way in which these state law systems
function alongside the federal bankruptcy laws.
III. STUDY DESIGN & METHODOLOGY
This study examines every assignment for the benefit of creditors
commenced in South Florida from 2012 through 2014 in order to
understand better how often these procedures are used, by what sort of
debtors, and to what end. South Florida is defined as the three counties
making up the Miami-Fort Lauderdale-West Palm Beach metropolitan
statistical area:101 Miami-Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach counties.
proprietors, are eligible to commence an ABC.").
98. Harner, supra note 20, at 8-9 (noting that, while recognizing, an ABC could serve
a reorganization-type purpose, its effectiveness is limited geographically: "Even SMEs
have multi-state operations, and state law remedies may prove inefficient in such
situations"). But see Mann, supra note 26, at 1415 (noting that an ABC can "operate[] as a
low-cost privately ordered reorganization" provided the assignee can keep the business
running long enough to sell as a going concern).
99. Harner & Griffin, supra note 23 at 209-10 & n.11 ("The Chapter 11 process does,
however, offer a distressed company tools not otherwise available outside of bankruptcy,"
with those tools including "the debtor's ability to decide unilaterally (for the most part) to
assume or reject contracts and leases, to obtain financing that primes existing liens (thus
providing a source of capital not available outside of bankruptcy), to sell some or all of its
assets free and clear of all liens and claims, and to delay the payment of and restructure
its prepetition obligations while continuing to operate the business" (citing 11 U.S.C. §§
362, 363, 364, 365, 1129 (2012)).
100. Id.
101. The Office of Management and Budget delineates metropolitan statistical areas
for census and labor data. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, OMB BULL. No. 15-01, REVISED DELINEATIONS OF METROPOLITAN
STATISTICAL AREAS, MICROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREAS, AND COMBINED STATISTICAL
AREAS, AND GUIDANCE ON USES OF THE DELINEATIONS OF THESE AREAS 41 (2015),
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The three years, 2012, 2013, and 2014, capture a period during which
court files were accessible in a cost-effective manner, as most of the
court files were made electronically available beginning in 2013.102 As
discussed below, data were gathered from court filings, obtained mostly
electronically and supplemented with paper copies from each county's
court records.10S
A. Data Collection Methodology
The study identified assignments for the benefit of creditor
proceedings by searching the public notice section of the primary legal
journals in South Florida, namely, the Miami and Broward Daily
Business Reviews and the South Florida Business Journal.104 Florida
law requires the assignee file a notice of assignment once a week for
four weeks, within ten days of the assignment.105 Consistent with the
language in the statute's model "Notice of Assignment,"106 cases were
identified by searching for the terms "notice of assignment" and
"chapter 727."
The notices of assignment contained the names of the assignor and
assignee, the court where the proceeding was commenced, and the case
number of the ABC proceeding. Using that information, case files were
largely accessible via the county courts' online records.107 For those
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/bulletins/2015/15-01.pdf.
102. For Miami-Dade and Broward counties, documents filed before April 1, 2013,
must be viewed in the paper file. See FLA. COURTS E-FILING AUTH., UPDATE ON COUNTY
CIVIL DIVISION EFILING IN THE ELEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT (2013),
https://www.judl 1ficourts.
org/docs/eFILINGAnnouncementCountyCivil.pdf; 17th Judicial Circuit eFiling, 17TH JUD.
CIRCUIT CT. FLA., http://www.17th.flcourts.org/index.php/self-help/efiling-program (last
visited Nov. 10, 2016). For the ABCs commenced in 2012, this meant that all filings made
before this date needed to be collected in hard copy.
103. Florida's ABC procedure is supervised by state courts, unlike some states in which
the process is extra-judicial. This has the virtue of enabling data collection of this sort;
however, it may limit the extent to which the findings here can be generalized to other
extrajudicial jurisdictions. See infra Part III.
104. Searches in general circulation newspapers, such as the Miami Herald, produced
no results.
105. FLA. STAT. § 727.111 (2015); see also id. § 727.111(2) (providing Florida's model
"Notice of Assignment"), attached here as Appendix A.
106. See FLA. STAT. § 727.111(2).
107. E.g., Case Search - Public, HOWARD C. FORMAN CLERK OF THE CTS.,
https://www.clerk- 17th-flcourts.org/Web2/CaseSearch/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2016)
(Broward County); eCaseView, SHARON R. BOCK CLERK & COMPTROLLER, http://www.
mypalmbeachclerk.com/courtrecords.aspx (last visited Nov. 10, 2016) (Palm Beach
County); Miami-Dade County Civil, Family, and Probate Courts Online System, HARVEY
RUVIN CLERK OF THE CTS., https://www2.miami-dadeclerk.com/ocs/ (last visited Nov. 10,
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filings that were not electronically available-as was the case with all
filings from Palm Beach County-paper copies of court filings were
obtained from each courthouse.
The study drew principally from three types of filings: the complaint
(which contains a schedule of assets and liabilities); sale motions; and
the final report (which describes and lists how assets were distributed
among creditors, as well as any objections filed thereto). In addition, the
study noted whether the creditors commenced an involuntary
proceeding against the debtor after the assignment.
The petition and schedules provided information about the
assignors. First, petitions listed the nature of the assignor's business.
For those that did not, the type of business was determined by
searching Bloomberg.com by company name.10s The business type was
then classified according to the Standard Industrial Classification
Division ("SIC Division"), promulgated by the U.S. Department of
Labor.109 These divisions classify businesses as falling under one of ten
divisions: Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing; Mining; Construction;
Manufacturing; Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas, and
Sanitary Services; Wholesale Trade; Retail Trade; Finance, Insurance,
and Real Estate; Services; and, Public Administration.110
Second, the schedules provide a snapshot of the assignors' debt
structure. Each case was coded with a categorical variable for secured
claims. The presence of secured claims is relevant, since secured
creditors may easily thwart an ABC proceeding by foreclosing on their
collateral, as discussed above. Thus, ABCs are only possible if the
secured creditor does not oppose the procedures. The total liabilities of
each case were also listed as a proxy for the debtor's size. Other
empirical studies of bankruptcy debtors have measured size by debt, by
assets, or by a combination of the two.1' This study focused exclusively
on debt, as asset values were reported inconsistently in the
schedules.112
Finally, the schedules provided data regarding equity interests in
the assignor, listing the identities of all shareholders and their
2016) (Miami-Dade County).
108. See, for example, Company Overview of Sanare, LLC, BLOOMBERG, http://www.
bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapid=113630414 (last visited
Nov. 10, 2016), for the search results for Sanare, LLC.
109. See Occupational Safety & Health Admin., SIC Division Structure, U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR, https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/sicmanual.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2016).
110. Id.
111. See, e.g., Mann, supra note 26, at 1416; Morrison, supra note 26, at 277.
112. Some schedules listed asset values as book value, others as liquidation value, and
still others as the debtor's equity in the assets.
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ownership interest. Each case was coded for the number of
shareholders, as well as for a "closely held" categorical variable. A
debtor was considered "closely held" if it was owned by ten or fewer
individual shareholders. Debtors with more than ten shareholders, or
that were owned by a holding company, were coded as "dispersely
owned" companies.
The petition also provided procedural information, namely, the
county in which the case was commenced, the identity of the assignee,
the identity of assignee's counsel, and the judge's identity. These data
were potentially relevant to measure the importance, if any, of a
debtor's ability to choose her own assignee and, in Miami-Dade and
Broward counties, to move the case to each county's Complex Business
Division. In Miami-Dade and Broward counties, assignees may move to
classify an ABC as a complex business litigation, which transfers their
case to the Complex Business Division.113 In Miami-Dade County, there
was one complex business litigation judge during the study period.114 In
Broward County, there were three judges that presided over complex
business litigation.115 Although not directly related to the questions of
who is using ABCs and to what end, these data were collected to gain a
better understanding of the ABC system.
113. See In re Reaffirmation of the Creation of Section 40 ("Complex Business
Litigation Section"), Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Administrative Order No. 11-04, at 4 (Fla.
2011), https://www.jud11.flcourts.org/docs/CBL%20Section%2OProcedures%20and%20A
OC-11-04.pdf (reassigning "action[s] involving the dissolution of a business entity or an
assignment for the benefit of creditors" to the Complex Business Litigation Section "where
the matter in controversy exceeds the amount of . .. [$150,000]"). The Complex Business
Litigation Judge in Miami-Dade County is John W. Thornton, Jr. John W Thornton, Jr.,
ELEVENTH JUD. CIRCUIT OF FLA., http://www.judl1.flcourts.org/About-the-Court/Ourt-
Courts/Civil-Court/Complex-Business-Litigation (last visited December 27, 2016) . In
Broward County, Judges Robert Rosenberg and Jeffrey Streitfeld presided over complex
business; Judge Rosenberg retired in 2012, and Judge Streitfeld retired in 2014.
AGREE2DISAGREE MEDIATION & ARBITRATION, ROBERT A. ROSENBERG, ESQ. 1,
http://www.agree2disagree.com/BobRosenbergBio.pdf; Carlos Harrison, Retiring Judge
Streitfeld to Resume Musical Hobby, DAILY BUS. REV. (Aug. 22, 2014),
http://www.dailybusinessreview.com/id=1202667728179/
Retiring-Judge-Streitfeld-To-Resume-Musical-Hobby.
114. John W. Thornton, Jr., supra note 113.
115. Those judges are Judge Jack Tuter, Judge John J. Murphy III, and Judge Patti
Englander Henning. Division 07 Business Court Procedures, 17TH JUD. CIRCUIT CT. OF
FLA., http://www.17th.flcourts.org/index.php/judges/circuit-civil/complex-litigation-unit/
division-07 (last visited Nov. 10, 2016) (Judge Tuter); Division 19, 17TH JUD. CIRCUIT CT.
OF FLA., http://www.17th.flcourts.org/index.php/judges/circuit-civil/complex-litigation-
unit/division-19 (last visited Nov. 10, 2016) (Judge Murphy); Division 26, 17TH JUD.
CIRCUIT CT. OF FLA., http://www.17th.flcourts.org/index.php/judges/circuit-civil/complex-
litigation-unit/division-26 (last visited Nov. 10, 2016) (Judge Englander Henning).
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The sale motions and orders provided information as to case
outcomes, namely, whether the assets were sold at a public auction,
abandoned to the secured creditor, or sold all together. Public auctions,
abandonments, and collection/sale of receivables were all coded as
"liquidations."116 Sales of substantially all assets were coded as "going
concern sales." Technically, such sales would not be true going concern
sales, since the assignee could sell only the assets and not the company
itself; however, a sale of all, or substantially all, assets is effectively a
sale of the business itself.117 Further, the price in such a sale
presumably reflects the going-concern value of the group of assets.
Thus, this study classifies such sales as going concern sales, consistent
with the use of this term in the bankruptcy context.118
For each going concern sale, the study identified the purchaser as
an "insider" if the purchaser was an owner, shareholder, manager, or
relative of the debtor/assignor. This definition comports with the
meaning of "insider" under the Bankruptcy Code.119 In some cases, the
sale motions disclosed this relationship. In many cases, though, the
purchaser's relationship with the assignor was undisclosed. In these
cases, information about the purchaser was gleaned from its corporate
records through the Florida Department of State Division of
Corporations.120 The names of these listed officers and directors were
then compared to the corporate records of the assignor and to the
information in the assignor's schedules. When at least the last names
matched, the purchaser was coded as an insider.121 This methodology
116. There may be important distinctions among these three outcomes; however, they
ultimately result in winding down the debtor and thus are grouped together in this way.
117. In small business cases, this may be less true, as the owner often times may be the
business, e.g., there is no Michael's Gourmet Deli without Michael.
118. See Matthew A. Bruckner, Improving Bankruptcy Sales by Raising the Bar:
Imposing A Preliminary Injunction Standard for Objections to § 363 Sales, 62 CATH. U. L.
REV. 1, 13-15 (2012) [hereinafter Bruckner, Improving Bankruptcy] (describing going
concern sales); Melissa B. Jacoby & Edward J. Janger, Ice Cube Bonds: Allocating the
Price of Process in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, 123 YALE. L.J. 862, 889-90 (2014)
("[C]orporate bankruptcy always involves a sale of some kind: either the estate is formally
sold to outside purchasers (piecemeal or as a going concern), or functionally sold to its
own stakeholders through a plan of reorganization." (citing Douglas G. Baird & Donald S.
Bernstein, Absolute Priority, Valuation Uncertainty, and the Reorganization Bargain, 115
YALE L.J. 1930, 1937 (2006))).
119. 11 U.S.C. § 101(31)(B) (2012) (defining "insider" of a corporation to include a "(i)
director of the debtor; (ii) officer of the debtor; (iii) person in control of the debtor; (iv)
partnership in which the debtor is a general partner; (v) general partner of the debtor; or
(vi) relative of a general partner, director, officer, or person in control of the debtor").
120. FLA. DEP'T OF STATE Div. OF CORPS., http://www.sunbiz.org/ (last visited Nov. 10,
2016).
121. There were some borderline categorizations, e.g., in one case the purchaser was
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may have under-counted the true number of insider sales, as it relies on
self-reporting in the assignor's schedules as to ownership interests.
Further, it may have missed sales to relatives with non-matching last
names.
The assignee's final report and petition for allowance of
administrative expenses were used to determine distributions made to
creditors and the costs of administration. The final report might list
that the encumbered assets were liquidated or abandoned to the
secured creditors, recoveries to secured creditors, and distribution (if
any) to priority and general unsecured creditors.
B. Data
During the three-year study period, there were ninety-six ABCs
commenced in South Florida.122 Among these ninety-six filings, there
were nine corporate groups that either filed a single collective ABC123 or
multiple ABCs for each affiliate. Counting each group as a single "case,"
there were a total of eighty-one cases in the study. Roughly 40% of the
cases were filed in Miami-Dade County, another 45% in Broward
County, and 15% in Palm Beach County. As a point of rough
comparison, this number of ABCs nearly matches the number of
businesses that filed for bankruptcy relief as "small business debtors"
under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.124
the owner's ex-spouse, Matta International, Inc. In that case, though, the ex-spouse was
also a former director of the business, so he was categorized as an "insider."
122. A complete list of ABCs filed is in Appendix B.
123. For example, Shoreline Flooring Supplies 2 of Orlando, Inc., Shore-Line Carpet
Supplies of Jacksonville., Inc., and Shore-Line Carpet Supplies, Inc. of Orlando filed a
single petition for assignment, although they were three separate corporations. In
contrast, Tire Depot and Auto Services, Inc. and Tire Deport Group, LLC filed separate
petitions for assignment. Those petitions were administratively consolidated and,
ultimately, substantively consolidated.
124. This comparison is rough, both because it relies on bankruptcy figures based on
debtors' self-reported status as small business debtors-something debtors may not be
accurately doing, particularly when they file as an individual whose debts are primarily
business debts. See Elizabeth Warren & Robert Lawless, The Myth of the Disappearing
Business Bankruptcy, 93 CAL. L. REV. 743, 779 (2005) (concluding that the Administrative
Office of the U.S. Courts has under-counted the number of business bankruptcy filings).
As to the ABCs in this study, most would likely qualify as a "small business debtor" under
§ 101(51D) of the Bankruptcy Code, but some would not. 11 U.S.C. § 101(51D). The
Bankruptcy Code defines a "small business debtor" as one that has "aggregate
noncontingent liquidated secured and unsecured debts" of less than $2,566,050, excluding
debts owed to affiliates and insiders. Id. § 101(51D)(A). Excluded from this definition are
(1) debtors in a case in which there is a "sufficiently active and representative" unsecured
creditors' committee and (2) debtors "whose primary activity is the business of owning or
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Figure 2: Total Debts per SIC Divisions
Total Debt MeanIndustry N %
(Median)
$1,878,170
Services 23 28% $1,396)
(616,396)
Wholesale 17 21% $3,177,246
($2,300,000)
$10,200,000Manufacturing 12 15% $2,300,000
($2,300,000)
Retail 12 15% $2,000,000
($1,200,000)
Finance 6 7% $3,500,000
($4,200,000)
$18,100,000Construction 6 7% $740,000
($740,000)
Communications 3 4% $2,400,000
($2,400,000)
Unknown 2 2% $2400,000
($2,400,000)
TOTAL 81 100% $4100,000
($1,400,000)
The assignor's total liabilities ranged widely, but the majority of
these debtors would likely qualify as "small business debtors" under the
Bankruptcy Code.127 The average total debt was just over $4 million,
with a median of about $1.5 million. Nearly 60% of the cases reported
total liabilities of $2 million or less. Eighty percent of the cases reported
total liabilities of $5 million or less.
Most of the debtors reported owing at least some secured debt, with
65% listing secured creditors. Generally, only the smallest debtors in
the sample had no secured creditors. The twenty-three debtors with no
secured debt reported average total debts about five times lower than
those debtors with secured debts. And nearly every one of the largest
debtors reported carrying secured debt.
Finally, as to procedural data, there was significant evidence of
professionalization among the assignees. Although assignors may in
theory choose anyone to be the assignee, more than 80% of the
assignments were made to one of four firms.128 One of these firms
127. See supra note 124.
128. These firms were, in descending order of number of cases, Michael Moecker &
Associates, Inc.; John A. Moffa, Esq.; Kenneth A. Welt; and Development Specialists, Inc.
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alone-Michael Moecker & Associates, Inc.-received more than 65% of
the assignments. To a lesser extent, there was a high degree of
specialization among the law firms involved in these cases, as the
assignees frequently hired a small group of law firms. The professional
assignees used a limited number of law firms, frequently hiring the
same firm as or, in some cases, their own firm.
To an even lesser extent, there was some specialization at the
judicial level. Thirty cases were sent to the complex business litigation
judges, meaning that three judges presided over about 40% of the ABCs
during this period.
Figure 3: Specialization of Assignees and Judges
Assignee N %
Michael Moecker & Assocs. 53 65%
John A. Moffa, Esq. 6 7%
Development Specialists, Inc. 4 5%









Roughly 60% of the completed ABC filings fit within the traditional
notion of a Chapter 7-style liquidation; the remaining 40% involved
sales of all or substantially all of the assignor's assets. Of these "going
concern sale" cases, nineteen (65%) were sold to insiders of the original
assignor.130 These outcomes did not vary significantly from county to
county within the study. Palm Beach County reported the highest
percentage of going concern sale and insider sale cases; however, the
number of filings in that county was the lowest of the three counties,
129. None of the other assignees received more than two assignments.
130. As noted above in the methodology of identifying "insiders," it is possible this
number under-represents the number of insider transactions, as the study relied on (a)
self-reporting and (b) identifying overall of officers/directors as listed in the articles of
incorporation of the assignor and purchaser. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
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making it impossible to eliminate the possibility that this heavy
concentration was by chance.131
Figure 4: Case Outcomes by County, Observations (%)
Insider Sale
Going (as % of
County Liquidation Concern Going TOTAL
Sale Concern
Sales)
Broward 20 (62.5%) 12 (37.5%) 8 (67%) 32
Miami-Dade 20 (62.5%) 12 (37.5%) 6 (50%) 32
Palm Beach 5(45%) 6(55%) 5(83%) 11
TOTAL 45 (56%) 30 (37%) 20 (69%) 75132
Outcomes were consistent across debtors regardless of whether they
reported secured debt or not. A case resulted in a going concern sale in
just over 40% of those cases involving secured debt, and just under 40%
of those without secured debt. The percentage of going concern sales
was likewise consistent across levels of debt. When dividing cases into
quintiles based on their total reported debts, there were only minor
differences in outcomes.
131. There was no statistically significant correlation between "County" and "outcome."
The Pearson's r was 0.567.
132. Outcomes were still pending in four cases, and data on outcomes were unavailable
for two cases.
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Figure 5: Percentage of Going Concern Sales by Total Debt
Going Concern Sales by Total Debt (Quintiles)
1-300 300-1,000 1,000-2,000 2,000-4,000 4,200-10,000
Total Debt, by Quintile ($ thousands)
There was some variation in outcomes across industry groups. All
cases involving financial services businesses were liquidated. In
contrast, the majority of the services firms were sold as a going concern,
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Figure 6: Case Outcomes by SIC Division
Percentage of Going Concern Sales, by Industry
-6 d 6'-,
IEME
Finally, as to administrative data, there was no clear linkage
between case outcomes and specialization in the ABC bench and bar.
Outcomes were roughly identical whether or not cases were sent to the
specialized Complex Business Division courts. There was likewise no
correlation between case outcome and whether the case was assigned to
one of the five "professional assignees." Nonetheless, within these five
firms, there was some discrepancy, as certain assignees had a higher
percentage of going concern sales and insider sales than others.
Figure 7: Case Outcomes by Assignee
Assignee Liquidaition Going Concern InsiderASale Sale
Michael Moecker & 31 (62%) 19 10
Assocs.
John A. Moffa, Esq. 3 (60%) 2 2
Development 1(20%) 4 4
Specialists, Inc.
Kenneth A. Welt 3 (75%) 1 1
Other 8 (67%) 4 2




Although there is no identifiable correlation between choice of
assignee and case outcome, there was some anecdotal evidence
suggesting the non-professional assignee cases were different. For
example, one case, which was actually six separate petitions to the
same assignee, illustrates this well. A group of limited liability entities
filed assignments, reporting as assets a group of condominium units in
Sunrise, Florida.133 Each unit was reported as "underwater," with the
value of the condos significantly less than the outstanding loans to the
mortgagees. The assignors assigned the units to the assignee, who then
successfully sought either to (a) force the mortgage holder to take title
to the units or (b) sell the units free and clear of the mortgages. Under
general principles of state mortgage law, neither of these remedies
would be available. Under bankruptcy law, a trustee might be entitled
to the "free and clear" sale power; but even in bankruptcy law, it is
unlikely a trustee could force a mortgagee to take title to the mortgaged
property.134 These cases were unusual both in their procedures as well
as in their adversarial posture with the secured creditors. As
mortgagees, the banks could have simply foreclosed on their collateral
and stopped the assignment; however, the lenders did not appear at all.
The case is worth highlighting because it helps shed some light on the
importance of professional assignees and their relationships with
secured creditors, which is considered more in Part IV infra.
B. Outcomes & Distributions to Creditors
Distributions to unsecured creditors were roughly identical
regardless of case outcome. Unsecured creditors received at least some
distribution in nineteen cases, or in about 30% of all cases, regardless of
whether the assets were liquidated or sold as a going concern. Among
the going concern cases, it did not matter whether the sale was to an
insider or not: either way, unsecured creditors received a distribution in
about 30% of the cases. -
Among the nineteen cases in which general unsecured creditors
received at least some distribution, that distribution ranged from as
little as 0.2% to 100%, with a mean of 20%. Unsecured creditors
received a mean distribution of 21% in liquidation cases, and 19% in
133. Jupiter 4/3 Realty Holdings, LLC (Broward 13-002573); Saturn .2 Realty
Holdings, LLC (Broward 12-28357); Saturn Realty Holdings, LLC (Broward 12-03152);
Mars 3/3 Realty Holdings, LLC (Broward 13-006970); HOI Realty Holdings, LLC
(Broward 12-33950); and Mercury 3/5 Realty Holdings, LLC (Broward 13-007729).
134. See In re Zair, 535 B.R. 15, 21 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2015) (describing the split among
courts as to whether a debtor's Chapter 13 plan may "vest" title to collateral in a secured
creditor over that creditor's objection), rev'd, 550 B.R. 188 (E.D.N.Y. 2016).
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going concern sale cases. Distributions to unsecured creditors were
highest among insider sale cases, with a mean distribution of 23%.
The data regarding distributions to general unsecured creditors, it
is important to note, may both understate and overstate actual
distributions to creditors. It potentially understates distributions to the
extent the purchasing creditor assumed some or all of the unsecured
debts. This happened in almost all of the "reorganization" cases, in
which the former owner-operator might, for example, assume her lease
obligation in order to continue operating at the same location.
This figure may overstate the distribution, because distribution
rates count only those general unsecured creditors that actually filed a
proof of claim in the ABC case.135 General unsecured creditors may lack
the incentive to file a claim when they know they are likely to receive
little to nothing from the case. Unsecured creditors may be even less
likely to file a claim in an ABC case to the extent they are unfamiliar
with the ABC process.
C. Interaction with Bankruptcy
Bankruptcy law operated in the background of every case, as
creditors had the ability to commence an involuntary bankruptcy
proceeding and thereby obtain federal bankruptcy court oversight of the
case.136 Generally, creditors may commence an involuntary bankruptcy
case only if they can show that the debtor is generally not paying its
debts; however, this showing is not required if the debtor has filed an
ABC.137
Upon an involuntary petition for bankruptcy, the bankruptcy court
could then remove the case from state court or, if satisfied that the ABC
was adequately protecting the rights of the debtor and the creditors,
abstain from accepting the bankruptcy case.
138
The interaction between bankruptcy and ABC law was most
apparent in two situations. The first is the filing of an involuntary
petition. Involuntary petitions are widely acknowledged as being
135. In a bankruptcy case, creditors in a Chapter 7 case must file a proof of claim. FED.
R. BANKR. PROC. 3002. In Chapter 11, creditors must likewise file a proof of claim in order
to obtain a distribution, unless the debtor lists the liability as non-disputed, non-
contingent, and liquidated. See FED. R. BANKR. PROc. 3003(b)(1); Anne M. Lawton &
Lynda J. Oswald, Scary Stories and the Limited Liability Polluter in Chapter 11, 65
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 451, 521 (2008).
136. 11 U.S.C. § 303 (2012).
137. Id. § 303(h). In order to take advantage of the ABC-exception, the creditors must
file the petition within 120 days of the assignment. Id. § 303(h)(2).
138. 11 U.S.C. § 305(a) (providing that the court may also abstain).
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extremely rare, and that held true in this data set.18 9 Only twice did
creditors attempt to file an involuntary petition.140
The second situation is when the parties seek to incorporate the
Bankruptcy Code to supplement Florida's ABC law. That is, assignees
at times requested relief not authorized by Florida's statute, arguing
instead that the state court should grant the relief by analogizing to
bankruptcy law.
Data as to involuntary bankruptcy petitions was available, as a
notice of bankruptcy was filed in the ABC case; however, there was no
systematic way to search for assignees' requesting bankruptcy-like
relief. In reviewing dockets, though, examples occasionally were
obvious, one of which is described below. While it may not be indicative
of this practice broadly, it is illustrative of the ways in which Florida
ABCs may be even more bankruptcy-like than they appear on their
face.
An example of the first sort of interaction was that of Radiology
Corporation of America, in which three petitioning creditors filed an
involuntary bankruptcy proceeding against the debtor under Chapter 7
of the Bankruptcy Code.141 The bankruptcy court, without dismissing
the petition or abstaining, authorized the assignee to continue
conducting the ABC in state court.142 The bankruptcy court permitted
the assignee to carry out the ABC under Florida law but ordered that, if
any party objected to any action in the ABC, the bankruptcy court
would resolve any such objection.143 When the assignee sought to
establish a procedure to sell the assets, the state court approved but
required the assignee to obtain both bankruptcy and state court
approval of the sale.144 Accordingly, the petitioning creditors were able
to establish bankruptcy court oversight of the ABC proceeding.
* An example of the second type of bankruptcy-ABC interaction
139. See Jason Kilborn & Adrian Walters, Involuntary Bankruptcy As Debt Collection:
Multi-Jurisdictional Lessons in Choosing the Right Tool for the Job, 87 AM. BANKR. L.J.
123, 132 (2013) (listing the "combination of factors" that have "reduced involuntary
bankruptcy to the rarest of exceptions in U.S. practice").
140. Chapter 7 Involuntary Petition at 1, In re Radiology Corp. of Am., No. 14-bk-
18574 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Apr. 15, 2014) (No. 14-bk-18574), Entry No. 1; Chapter 7
Involuntary Petition at 1, In re Arthritis & Back Pain Ctrs., Inc., No. 12-14621 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. Feb. 27, 2012), Entry No. 1.
141. Chapter 7 Involuntary Petition, In re Radiology Corp., supra note 139, at 2.
142. Order Granting Emergency Motion to Excuse Compliance with 11 U.S.C. § 543(a),
(b), and (c) at 2, In re Radiology Corp., No. 14-bk-18574 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Apr. 30, 2014),
Entry No. 12.
143. Id. at 2-3.
144. Order Granting First Amended Expedited Motion at 2-3, In re Radiology Corp.,
No. 14-bk-18574 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. June 6, 2014), Entry No. 61.
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occurred in the ABC of Fotobar, LLC, a business engaged in "retail
photographic products and services."145 The assignee decided to sell the
company as a going concern but soon realized it lacked the liquidity to
pay employees and vendors.146 Accordingly, the assignee sought
permission to obtain post-petition financing, secured by a lien on the
debtor's assets.147 While such practice is typical in bankruptcy cases,
there is no such authority under Florida's ABC law. The assignee thus
relied on federal bankruptcy court authority for this request, arguing
that '[s]tate courts often look to federal bankruptcy law for guidance as
to legal issues arising in proceeding[s] involving assignments for the
benefit of creditors."'148 The court approved this order, allowing the
assignee to obtain a $2.5 million line of credit and to grant the lender a
secured and administrative claim on account of any advances.
Fotobar, then, was able to continue in operation during the ABC
proceeding until it could complete a sale (to its post-petition lender), all
because it was able to supplement he ABC relief by analogizing to the
bankruptcy laws. The lender was able to then purchase the assets of
Fotobar for $75,000 in cash plus a credit bid of $1,150,000.149 The
assignee then made a 100% distribution to priority creditors and a .2%
distribution to the general unsecured creditors.150
V. ANALYSIS
These findings indicate that, contrary to conventional wisdom,
ABCs may provide a viable state law alternative to Chapter 11
corporate reorganization under the Bankruptcy Code. Although many of
the debtors did in fact liquidate in ABCs, a sizable percentage of
business owners were able to use the ABC to retain their equity interest
and restructure the business's liabilities-all without the costs and
risks of bankruptcy. The study reveals that the ABC proceedings were
more bankruptcy-like in substance, administration, and outcomes. After
briefly describing these similarities, this Section considers the
implications of these findings as to the ways in which state debtor-
145. Assignee's Motion for Approval of Post-Petition Financing at 2, Fotobar, L.L.C. v.
Phelan, No. 14-ca-10564 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Sept. 15, 2014).
146. Id. at 2-3.
147. Id. at 3.
148. Id. at 4 (second alteration in original) (quoting Moecker v. Antoine, 845 So. 2d
904, 911 n.10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)).
149. Assignee's Motion to: (A) Approve Fees and Expenses of Assignee and Assignee's
Counsel; (B) Approve Assignee's Final Report and Proposed Distribution; (C) Discharge




creditor laws interact with federal bankruptcy laws.
Substantively, the cases in this study reveal that Florida's ABC
laws are even more bankruptcy-like than they appear on their face.
While the Florida ABC statute is similar to the Bankruptcy Code, as
applied in these cases, the ABC statute is even more bankruptcy-like,
particularly as to the powers available to the assignee. Assignees were
able to obtain relief normally thought to be available solely in
bankruptcy law, chiefly, the power to sell assets "free and clear" of liens
and interests;151 the power to obtain post-petition financing;152 and the
power to substantively consolidate a corporate group.153 These powers
are nowhere mentioned in the Florida ABC statute, but assignees
nonetheless were able to exercise these powers with court approval
under the statute's "negative notice" provisions.
Administratively, some of these ABCs looked very much like a large
Chapter 11 corporate reorganization. These large Chapter 11 cases
have dynamics significantly different than that of smaller business
debtors largely because active creditor participation is an expensive
ordeal, justified only when creditors have substantial sums of money at
stake.154 In these large cases, it is common for a secured lender to
demand the appointment of a "Chief Restructuring Officer (CRO)."i55
151. 11 U.S.C. § 363 (2012).
152. Id. § 364.
153. See William H. Widen, Corporate Form and Substantive Consolidation, 75 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 237, 313-17 (2007). Substantive consolidation is conventionally considered
to be a bankruptcy-specific remedy, even though it is not specifically authorized by the
Bankruptcy Code. Id. at 313. This power, though, has its roots in equity and was
historically used outside of bankruptcy. See id. at 317-19.
154. Select Advisory Comm. on Bus. Reorganization, Am. Bar. Ass'n, Second Report of
the Select Advisory Committee on Business Reorganization, 60 BUS. LAW. 277, 304 (2004)
("The reasons committees do not operate in so many chapter 11 cases probably vary from
case to case and may involve some combination of apathy, creditors having little at stake,
the debtor having few unencumbered assets from which to make distributions or
compensate committee professionals, creditor interests being highly fragmented, and
individual creditor claims being so small that few unsecured creditors can justify the time
and expense of serving on a committee."). See generally Carl A. Eklund & Lynn W.
Roberts, The Problem with Creditors' Committees in Chapter1l: How to Manage the
Inherent Conflicts Without Loss of Function, 5 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 129 (1997);
Douglas G. Baird et al., The Dynamics of Large and Small Chapter 11 Cases: An
Empirical Study (Yale Sch. of Mgmt., Yale ICF Working Paper No. 05-29, 2007),
http://depot.som.yale.edulicf/papers/fileuploads/2524/original/05-29.pdf.
155. Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing Lever of
Corporate Governance, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1209, 1233 (2006) (mentioning that lenders may
use the appointment of a CRO as a pre-condition to lending or as a condition for
forgiveness of a default, and noting that lenders may be more willing to waive a loan
covenant "if a CRO with whom they have worked before is in place and cleaning shop");
see also A. Mechele Dickerson, Privatizing Ethics in Corporate Reorganizations, 93 MINN.
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Such an officer provides a strong governance tool for lenders, providing
lenders with control over the bankruptcy proceedings as well as
verification benefits about the debtor's operations and assets.1S6 A CRO
serves not only to maximize the value of the estate but also to bring a
level of trust and security to creditors, particularly to the secured
creditors.1 57 ABCs may provide a similar sort of creditor protection for
debtors that are otherwise too small to justify the costs of having a CRO
in bankruptcy. In ABCs, a professional assignee with a strong
reputation among secured lenders may serve the same function as a
CRO.iss Like a CRO, a professional assignee may provide the lender
with verification benefits and some level of control. Instead of
determining whether to trust a borrower, a lender may instead rely on
its relationship with the assignee. Assignees, as repeat players in this
field, face high reputation costs for frustrating the expectations of
lenders.159
The result of these bankruptcy-like procedures, substantive law,
and administrative procedures is that ABCs are providing something
much closer to a true bankruptcy alternative than previously
appreciated for corporate debtors, particularly smaller debtors with few
out-of-state assets and creditors.160
L. REV. 875, 920 (2009) (noting that lenders "have embraced the concept of replacing
managers with private turnaround specialists" instead of seeking a public trustee, and
that "CROs have been retained in approximately thirty percent of the largest Chapter 11
filings").
156. See Dickerson, supra note 153, at 918-20.
157. See id. at 922-23.
158. Mann noted the importance of assignees' reputation in his study, reporting that
creditors may tolerate an ABC in California-a jurisdiction in which ABCs are commonly
used-only "where they have confidence that the assignee will protect their interests
actively." See Mann, Liquidation Choices, supra note 26, at 1421-22. Thus, he suggests
"there is some reason to believe that reputational constraints will have a substantial
effect on assignees." Id. at 1421.
159. The importance of the assignee's reputation raises important law-in-action
questions, discussed in a little more depth below, but which this paper highlights for
future research on the debtors' reorganization choices. The assignee-as-CRO dynamic
suggests that the assignee's relation with secured creditors may be a driving factor in
determining which debtors avail themselves of ABCs instead of bankruptcy. In contrast,
Morrison's research has suggested it was the relationship of the business owner and
secured creditor. Morrison, supra note 26, at 270 ("The likelihood of a federal bankruptcy
filing may rise when it is costly for senior lenders to verify the value of a debtor's
assets. . . . When a firm's owners have private information about the value of assets, a
secured creditor may prefer federal bankruptcy law as a mechanism for verifying asset
value. The incentive to use federal law will be even strong when there are multiple
secured creditors, who may have different beliefs about asset value." (footnote omitted)).
160. But see Body Central Corp., the national retail chain that many expected to file
for bankruptcy relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code but that instead filed an
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In considering the implications of these results, it is first important
to consider these findings in light of the geographic limitations of the
data set. The court-centered and bankruptcy-like nature of Florida's
ABC law makes Florida unusual, which limits attempts to draw broad
national conclusions from this study. The limitation largely comes down
to the impact of having a court-centered process. The most obvious
impact of such a system is on legal costs: more court filings and
supervision means higher legal fees.161 The higher costs may make
ABCs less accessible in Florida than in an extra-judicial ABC
jurisdiction like California. But, as long as the ABC procedure is less
expensive than a similar federal bankruptcy procedure, then the
relative cost of judicial and extra-judicial ABCs is unlikely to be
significant..
The real question about a court-centered process is whether it
provides greater protections for creditors. On the one hand, court
proceedings may provide greater protections in the form of court
oversight, transparency, and predictability. Creditors may easily access
court records and seek court intervention. On the other hand, these
protections only serve those creditors that actually participate in the
process. Creditors who lack the sophistication or economic incentive to
participate in the process receive no value from the court process. In
fact, they may be harmed to the extent that courts grant assignees
greater power and discretion whenever creditors fail to raise an
objection. Thus, if creditors are not actively participating in the ABC, a
court supervised system may actually give greater control to debtors
and their assignees.
To the extent Florida's heavily regulated procedure provides
creditors with greater protections than they would receive in less
regulated ABCs, the outcomes in Florida may be interpreted as
conservative estimates as to what is happening in ABCs under other
states. For example, if the Florida outcomes suggest reasons to be
concerned about the interests of unsecured creditors, one might assume
that those concerns may be even higher under other state laws. If, on
the other hand, the court-centered process actually expands assignee
ABC in Jacksonville, Florida. Mark Basch, A Stunning End for Body Central After 42
Years, DAILY REC. (Jan. 12, 2015, 11:52 AM), https://www.jaxdailyrecord.com/showstory.
php?Storyid=544680. That case is still pending, but it may ultimately suggest that ABCs
are capable of serving as a bankruptcy alternative even for larger corporations (and
perhaps specifically for retailers, for whom bankruptcy reorganization is essentially no
longer available). See id.; Lauren Coleman-Lochner, Body Central to Close All 265 Stores,
Fire 2,500 Workers, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 9, 2015, 5:08 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2015-01-09/body-central-to-close-all-265-stores-fire-2-500-workers.
161. See Landon, supra note 42, at 1481-82.
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powers at the expense of unsecured creditors, the concerns for
unsecured creditors in Florida may be higher than in other states.
Finally, any generalizations about the Florida-focused findings here
may be limited by the importance of South Florida's legal culture.
Scholars have long appreciated the importance of local legal culture in
bankruptcy law, noting regional disparities in the use of bankruptcy
and in outcomes, even though the Bankruptcy Code itself is federal
law.162 This local legal culture may explain variations in outcomes
unrelated to variations in the "law on the books." This may reflect local
economic conditions, local values and norms.
With these limitations in mind, the findings here raise important
questions about the interaction of state and federal law in this field of
corporate reorganization. The first class of questions raises legal issues:
Did Congress leave room for the states to create such an alternative to
the federal bankruptcy laws and, if so, what are the limits of that state
power? The second class raises systemic issues: Is it desirable to have
state law alternatives to bankruptcy? Who will benefit from such a
system? And who may suffer? And the third set raises empirical
questions for future research about this dynamic. Although the study
here shows that business debtors may "succeed" in reorganizing under
ABCs, how do these debtors fare in the long run? And if debtors may
obtain most bankruptcy-like relief under ABCs at a lower cost, why do
debtors file bankruptcy?
This Section concludes by considering what, if anything, these
findings might mean for future bankruptcy reform. To the extent ABCs
are indeed better than bankruptcy in some ways, what could
bankruptcy law learn from the success of state law procedures? And to
the extent ABCs may give too much power to debtors, how might
bankruptcy law be amended to restrain this power?
A. Legal Questions
These findings raise important questions as to the interaction of
federal and state law in the field of corporate bankruptcy. Although
creditors in this study did not challenge the legitimacy of the state law
procedures, the Constitution imposes at least some restraints on states'
162. See Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren, & Jay L. Westbrook, The Persistence of
Local Legal Culture: Twenty Years of Evidence from the Federal Bankruptcy Courts, 17
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 801, 804 (1994) (defining "local legal culture" as "systematic and
persistent variations in local legal practices as a consequence of a complex of perceptions
and expectations shared by many practitioners and officials in a particular locality, and
differing in identifiable ways from the practices, perceptions, and expectations existing in
other localities subject to the same or a similar formal legal regime").
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ability to pass bankruptcy-like laws.
The first limitation states face is geographical. Practically, state
laws may prove ineffective at administering an estate with out-of-state
assets and creditors.163 To be effective, a bankruptcy law must be able
to bind all estate creditors and administer all estate assets-that is, the
bankruptcy law's reach must cover all market participants.164 A state
ABC law does not have the national reach of a bankruptcy law: it would
instead require assistance from other states to enforce orders and to
reach creditors. But, the recent ABC liquidation of the national retail
chain Body Central Corporation may suggest that these regional
limitations are not insurmountable.165
The second limitation more directly challenges ABC statutes.
States' power to grant bankruptcy-like relief is constrained by both the
Contracts Clause and the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, as
federal bankruptcy law preempts conflicting state laws.166 Arguably,
these restraints may provide grounds for creditors to challenge ABCs,
in particular the Supremacy Clause.
The Contracts Clause, as discussed above, prohibits states from
passing any law impairing the obligation of contracts. 167 Prior to the
enactment of the federal bankruptcy laws, the Contracts Clause
prohibited states from applying new ABC laws to pre-existing contracts;
however, it would not prohibit states from applying those laws
prospectively.168 State laws, then, could provide a discharge of
indebtedness, so long as such discharge was applied only to contracts
163. See David A. Skeel, Jr., Rethinking the Line Between Corporate Law and
Corporate Bankruptcy, 72 TEX. L. REV. 471, 549 (1994) (considering these geographical
constraints as part of his argument that Congress should de-federalize corporate
bankruptcy law).
164. See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A Global Solution to Multinational Default, 98
MICH. L. REV. 2276, 2287 (2000) ("The historical experience has been that bankruptcy law
is made coextensive with a market, so that national markets require national bankruptcy
laws . . . ."). Although Westbrook makes this "market symmetry" argument in the context
of cross-border insolvency (i.e., the insolvency of a debtor with assets and creditors in
more than one country), the point is applicable to state ABC laws, as state ABC laws are
analogous to national bankruptcy laws. See supra Section II.A.
165. See Basch, supra note 160; Coleman-Lochner, supra note 160. The case was filed
in Duval County. Florida. Mark C. v. Body Central Corp., No. 16-2015-CA-00213 (Fla. Cir.
Ct. Jan. 15, 2015).
166. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10; id. art. VI, cl. 2; see also Skeel. Jr., supra note 163, at
545-46, 551-52.
167. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 ("No state shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts . . . .").
168. Skeel, Jr., supra note 163, at 546-47 ("[Tlhe limitations imposed by the Contracts
Clause on state lawmaking would, at most, constitute a transition problem for the
proposal to shift bankruptcy authority to the states").
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incurred after the law took effect.169 The reasoning for this
retrospective/prospective distinction was that the "obligation of
contracts" was understood as incorporating the state enforcement
mechanisms for contracts.170 Thus, the obligation of contracts would
include the ABC statute. An ABC proceeding, then, would simply
enforce the obligation of contracts, not impair it. The Contracts Clause,
accordingly, would impose some transition costs on states' attempting to
add or expand their ABC laws, but it would not pose a long term
obstacle to state bankruptcy laws.171
The enactment of federal bankruptcy laws added an additional
federal restraint on state ABC laws by preempting conflicting state
laws.172 As stated by the Court in International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus in
1929, following the enactment of a federal bankruptcy law the "States
may not pass or enforce laws to interfere with or complement the
Bankruptcy Act or to provide additional or auxiliary regulations."173
The Court has held, though, that ABC laws fall out of this preemptive
scope, at least to the extent the ABC laws do not provide for the
discharge of debts.174 But since the Court last visited that issue in 1933,
there have been significant changes in preemption doctrine, in the
bankruptcy laws, and in ABC laws. It is not clear to what extent ABCs
would withstand preemption challenges under modern jurisprudence.
The only major preemption challenge to an ABC statute in the
modern era was in the Ninth Circuit, in which the court, somewhat
controversially, found that California's ABC law was preempted to the
extent it provided for the assignee's right to recover preferential
payments to creditors.175 The case was controversial not just because it
extended International Shoe for the first time but also because its




172. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261, 265 (1929).
173. Id.
174. Johnson v. Star, 287 U.S. 527 (1933); Pobreselo v. Joseph M. Boyd Co., 287 U.S.
518, 525-26 (1933) (upholding a Wisconsin ABC statute because (a) it did not invoke a
discharge of indebtedness, (b) did not require creditors to participate the proceeding, and
(c) was "quite in harmony with the purposes" of the bankruptcy laws).
175. Sherwood Partners, Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 394 F.3d 1198, 1206 (9th Cir. 2005); see
Geoffrey L. Berman & Catherine E. Vance, State Law Preference Actions: Still Alive After
Sherwood Partners v. Lycos, 26 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 24, 81 & n.8 (2008) (noting the
immediate criticism from many commentators).
176. See, e.g., Deborah A. Crabbe, Preemption and the Bankruptcy Code: Lessons from
Sherwood Partners, 24 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 5, 63 (2005); Bruce S. Nathan, Sherwood
Partners Threatens Viability of State Law Preference, 24 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 4, 66 (2005).
174
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Partners, the Ninth Circuit held that California's preference law would
interfere with the Bankruptcy Code's core purpose of equitably
distributing the estate's assets.177 The Ninth Circuit described the issue
as whether the California law "gives the state assignee powers that are
within the heartland of bankruptcy administration."178 That is, if it
created a new power available only to assignees, then it intruded upon
bankruptcy law's territory; if, instead, it merely gave the assignee
powers that were otherwise available to creditors outside of the ABC,
then it was safely under state law. The Ninth Circuit held that the
California law created new powers for the assignee, which powers
would alter the distributions that would have been made under the
bankruptcy laws-thus conflicting with the Bankruptcy Code's core
function of equitably distributing assets.179 Further, the distributional
difference would alter the incentives of creditors to file bankruptcy
instead of consenting to the ABC process, further conflicting with the
Bankruptcy Code's statutory incentives for the initiation of bankruptcy
proceedings.180
So far, this is the only preemption limitation on state ABC laws in
addition to the discharge restriction. But, as noted in the dissent, its
rationale could easily be extended to strike down ABCs more broadly.181
If bankruptcy law suspends any state law affecting creditors'
bankruptcy-state law calculus, then bankruptcy law would suspend a
broad swath of state debtor-creditor laws. State laws regarding
distribution priorities or property exemptions that affect this calculus,
for example, fall within the preemptive scope of the bankruptcy laws.182
Arguably, any state law that made it easier or harder for a creditor to
collect on its claim would likewise impact the bankruptcy-state law
calculus. The logic of the Sherwood Partners majority seems to have no
limiting principle.
Although the constitutional question about the extent to which
177. 394 F.3d at 1205-06.
178. Id. at 1201.
179. Id. at 1201-02 ("[T]he assignee ... is given new avoidance powers by virtue of his
position.").
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1206-08 (Nelson, J., dissenting) ("When the majority's reasoning is carried
to its logical extension, it has the effect of pushing corporations threatened with
insolvency from the less stigmatic, and less costly, voluntary assignment scheme into the
world of federal bankruptcy. This should not have to be the case.").
182. See Lynn M. LoPucki, A General Theory of the Dynamics of the State
Remedies/bankruptcy System, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 311, 354 (1982) ("A fourth factor is the
way in which available assets are divided among competing creditors in the two
subsystems.").
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ABCs and bankruptcy law may coexist remains unsettled, it is certainly
plausible that some creditors-particularly unsecured creditors-are
likely to raise these issues in the near future. In particular, one could
imagine a challenge to an assignee's authority to conduct a "free and
clear" sale. That power is generally understood to be available only
under bankruptcy law-and even then, the extent of this bankruptcy
power remains controversial. 183 It is not clear the extent to which "free
and clear sales" would survive a preemption analysis, particularly if the
unsecured creditor may remove the proceeding to a federal court, there
is a real possibility that a court might find these state "bankruptcy
laws" incompatible with the federal bankruptcy laws.
B. Systemic Concerns
The possibility of state "bankruptcy" laws poses potential systemic
problems, as creditors may have to adjust to multiple state
"bankruptcy" laws and states may have an incentive to pass business-
friendly laws. This Section considers first the problem of non-uniformity
in general before analyzing the potential for a race-to-the bottom in
ABC laws.
1. Non-Uniformity
Non-uniformity among the states may present challenges to
creditors that may ultimately raise the cost of credit. Although there is
considerable confusion about the origin and scope of the Bankruptcy
Clause, the inclusion of this enumerated power in the Constitution has
been understood to reflect, in large part, fears of the patchwork of state
insolvency laws.184 James Madison described the need for a federal
183. See Bruckner, Improving Bankruptcy Sales, supra note 118, at 18-19 (discussing
policy tensions in bankruptcy sales); George W. Kuney, Misinterpreting Bankruptcy Code
Section 363(f) and Undermining the Chapter 11 Process, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 235, 235
(2002) (noting that the power to sell property free of interests "is otherwise unavailable
under applicable nonbankruptcy law").
184. BRUCE H. MANN, REPUBLIC OF DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY IN THE AGE OF AMERICAN
INDEPENDENCE 187-88 (2002) ("[T]he idea that bankruptcy raised issues that were better
addressed on a national level rather than through the mechanisms of interstate comity
seems to have taken at least tentative root during the convention."); THE FEDERALIST
No. 42, at 232 (James Madison) (Gideon ed., 2001), http://lf-oll.s3.amazonaws.com/titles/
788/Hamilton_0084_EBk_v6.0.pdf ("The power of establishing uniform laws of
bankruptcy, is so intimately connected with the regulation of commerce, and will prevent
so many frauds where the parties or their property may lie, or be removed into different
states, that the expediency of it seems not likely to be drawn into question."); Jonathan C.
Lipson, Debt and Democracy: Towards A Constitutional Theory of Bankruptcy, 83 NOTRE
176
BETTER THAN BANKRUPTCY?
bankruptcy law to "prevent so many frauds where the parties or their
property may lie or be removed into different states."185 Justice Story
later wrote that only a federal system of government could prevent the
inevitable parochialism and confusion from leaving bankruptcy law in
the hands of the many states.186
The availability of a state bankruptcy law regime could threaten the
return of this pre-Constitution patchwork of state laws. Before lending
to a Florida debtor, for example, a lender would need to consider the
treatment of that loan under both the federal bankruptcy laws and
Florida's ABC statute. Differences between federal and state laws, and
among the different state laws, would likely increase the cost of credit.
To the extent this is a problem, this may give renewed attention to the
efforts to create a model ABC law.187
At the same time, though, many of those old fears about the
patchwork of state laws are largely limited by the Contracts Clause.
The type of fraud that James Madison mentioned involved debtors
moving to a new state in order to take advantage of its relatively more
pro-debtor bankruptcy laws.18s Thus, the Court has held that the
Contracts Clause prohibited a debtor from applying a Louisiana law to
discharge a debt contract incurred under the laws of South Carolina.189
That Louisiana statute could have discharged subsequent debts
incurred under the Louisiana statute without impairing the obligation
of contracts, because the discharge statute would have been
incorporated into the contract's obligations; however, since that law was
not incorporated into the South Carolina contract, to apply Louisiana's
law to discharge that contractual obligation would unconstitutionally
DAME L. REV. 605, 626 (2008) (describing "the bewildering array of colonial laws that
existed at the time"). But see Stephen J. Lubben, A New Understanding of the Bankruptcy
Clause, 64 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 319, 340 (2013) (noting alternative interpretations of the
Bankruptcy Clause as an extension of the Full Faith and Credit Clause).
185. THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, supra note 184, at 232.
186. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION 387 (1833), http://www.
thefederalistpapers.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/0 1/Commentaries-On-The-Constitution-
by-Joseph-Story-Abridged.pdf ("In short, diversities of almost infinite variety and objects
may be introduced into the local system, which may work gross injustice and inequality,
and nourish feuds and discontents in neighboring states. What is here stated, is not
purely speculative. It has occurred among the American states in the most offensive
forms, without any apparent reluctance or compunction on the part of the offending
state. . . . There can be no other adequate remedy, than giving a power to the general
government, to introduce and perpetuate a uniform system.").
187. See, e.g., Geoffrey L. Berman & Catherine E. Vance, Model Statute for General
Assignments for the Benefit of Creditors, 17 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 33, 40-59 (2009).
188. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
189. M'Millan v. M'Neill, 17 U.S. 209, 212-13 (1819).
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impair the obligation of contracts.19 0
2. Race to the Bottom
Not only would creditors need to navigate the "bankruptcy" laws of
the several states, but the de facto de-federalization of bankruptcy laws
might spark a race to the bottom, as states respond to pressures to
enact ever more "business friendly" ABCs in order to stimulate their
small business sector.191 States may also be especially prone to special
interest group lobbying, which may result in a proliferation of creditor
distribution priorities.192 All of this may require creditors to pay more
attention to local ABC laws, which could impose greater costs on
creditors, which would in turn increase the costs of lending.
On the other hand, state ABC laws may be superior to federal
bankruptcy law, leading to a race to the top. David Skeel has argued as
much in a similar context.193 Skeel has argued that corporate
bankruptcy law belongs with corporate law, specifically, that both
should be governed by state law,194 and has posited that such a state
corporate bankruptcy law would unlikely be overly debtor- or creditor-
friendly, as states must balance the interests of both business owners
and lenders.195 An overly-friendly creditor law would discourage
businesses from operating in that state; an overly debtor-friendly law
would likewise discourage business development, as lenders would
respond to this regime by increasing the cost of credit.196 Skeel's
argument was in the context of a proposal to make state law the sole
source of corporate bankruptcy law. This argument would likewise be
relevant for a state of the world with both state and federal corporate
bankruptcy law.
Even assuming Skeel's argument would apply to a dual bankruptcy
190. Id.
191. This debate has its roots in the seminal work of William L. Cary, Federalism and
Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974) and response thereto,
Ralph K. Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6
J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977).
192. During the brief time in which Congress experimented with adopting state law
distribution priorities, there was such a proliferation of such priorities that there was
seldom any assets remaining to distribute to the general unsecured creditors.
193. Skeel, Jr., supra note 163, at 518-20.
194. Id. at 520 (limiting his economic argument against race-to-the-bottom theorists to
consensual creditors).
195. Id. at 518 ("[M]arket pressures are likely to counteract any tendency states might
otherwise have to underappreciate shareholders' interests.").
196. Id. at 520.
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law regime, it does not address the plight of non-adjusting creditors.197
Non-adjusting creditors are those who are unable to adjust the terms of
credit to take into account the risks imposed by a change in the legal
system.195 Whereas a bank could change its lending terms in order to
protect itself from changes to the legal system, some creditors will not
be able to do so. Some creditors cannot adjust because they did not
choose to become creditors at all. Tort victims are the quintessential
involuntary creditors. Other creditors may be voluntary creditors but
are simply unable to adjust their lending terms. Trade creditors may
lack sufficient leverage to adjust their contract terms. Likewise,
employees may lack the negotiating power (and perhaps awareness) to
adjust the terms of their employment. Would state legislators
adequately take the interests of these creditors into account, or might
state bankruptcy laws effectively shift value from these non-adjusting
creditors to the debtor and its adjusting creditors?
The primary check on debtors' and assignees' ability to divert value
from general unsecured creditors would be the ability of these creditors
to commence an involuntary proceeding. If unsecured creditors timely
filed such a petition, they could obtain bankruptcy court supervision of
the ABC process.199 The bankruptcy court would examine the
protections afforded to creditors in that ABC proceeding and, if
satisfied, permit the ABC to continue in state court; if not satisfied, the
court could shift the insolvency proceeding to the bankruptcy system.200
But, as discussed in Section V.D below the findings here suggest that
these involuntary protections may be ineffective.
C. Empirical Questions
Finally, the findings here may suggest the need to refine our
understanding of small business bankruptcy laws. Small businesses
have been reported to reorganize at a lower rate than larger
corporations in Chapter 11.201 Explanations have ranged from blaming
197. See id. Skeel limits his consideration to consensual creditors who could adjust to
the de-federalized system by "charg[ing] more for credit so that, ex ante, a corporation and
its shareholders would not benefit at all from [a state's] inefficient law." Id.
198. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of
Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857, 864 (1996) (identifying "nonadjusting"
such as governmental regulatory and taxing bodies, whose claims are fixed by statute,
creditors whose claims are too small to justify the cost of adjusting their credit terms,
those that lend money on an unsecured basis prior to the debtor's creation of a security
interest for another creditor, and tort claimants).
199. 11 U.S.C. § 303 (2012); see also supra note 135-36 and accompanying text.
200. 11 U.S.C. § 303.
201. See Lawton, Chapter 11 Triage, supra note 32, at 1004-05.
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debtors (i.e., claims that small businesses fail because the owners lack
business sophistication) to blaming the bankruptcy laws.202 Consistent
with the bankruptcy-like relief debtors obtained in this study, a third
possible explanation is that viable business debtors are reorganizing
under ABCs, leaving more distressed debtors to file bankruptcy.
If ABCs may provide bankruptcy-like relief, then this may suggest
that selection bias explains the lower bankruptcy success rates for
small businesses. A debtor can commence an ABC only if an assignee is
willing to accept the assignment. Assignees may not be willing to accept
an assignment unless they have reason to believe (a) it will work out
and (b) it will pay. When secured creditors do not approve of the ABC,
the case is not likely to work out, as those creditors can foreclose on
their collateral. And a case in which there are insufficient assets to pay
the administrative and legal fees are unlikely to pay. Thus, the debtors
that end up in an ABC-especially those looking to reorganize under a
going concern sale-may be relatively "healthy" businesses as compared
to those that file bankruptcy. Chapter 11, under that theory, is not
failing to save these businesses; rather, the businesses that file
bankruptcy are beyond salvage. That is, as Professor LoPucki described
this interplay of federal and state laws: "[B]ankruptcy court deals not
with businesses in financial difficulty, but with their skeletons, already
picked clean by workouts, state court proceedings, informal
liquidations, or merely the ravages of time and poor management."203
Although further empirical research comparing assignors with
businesses in bankruptcy would be needed to test this hypothesis, the
findings here suggest that debtors would likely turn to bankruptcy
relief only after exhausting state law alternatives.
D. Implications for Bankruptcy Reform
This final section considers the implications of these findings for
bankruptcy reform. As mentioned above, there are current efforts
underway to reform Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code generally, and
202. See generally NAT'L BANKR. REV. COMM'N, FINAL REPORT, BANKRUPTcY: THE NEXT
TWENTY YEARs (1997), http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/nbre/reportcont.html. A common
complaint is that most small businesses that file bankruptcy have no real chance at
rehabilitation because of cash flow problems, not because of unsustainable debt
structures. Thomas E. Carlson, Jennifer Frasier Hayes, The Small Business Provisions of
the 2005 Bankruptcy Amendments, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 645, 654 (2005) (describing some of
the small business reporting requirements as necessary because "small business debtors
often lack basic financial information about their own operations").
203. LoPucki, supra note 182, at 312
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as applied to small businesses in particular.204 As to small businesses,
there is a concern that Chapter 11 is too expensive and that it fails to
provide these debtors with the tools to reorganize.205 According to some,
these failures have led debtors to choose state law alternatives to
bankruptcy.206
The findings reported here illustrate that debtors are indeed able to
use ABCs to obtain many of the benefits of Chapter 11, thus providing
support for these concerns about state law competition for distressed
businesses. Even more, the findings here show that this state law
competition is more robust than conventionally understood, as ABC
proceedings in this study provided powers to debtors generally thought
to be unavailable under non-bankruptcy law. In fact, the ABC relief
may be greater, since ABCs do not require that creditors be paid in full
in order for business owners to retain their equity interest in the
debtor.207
The findings also suggest hat bankruptcy law may be an ineffective
tool to protect creditor interests. In theory, creditors unhappy with the
debtor's use of an ABC may commence an involuntary bankruptcy
proceeding.208 If a creditor, for example, was concerned that a business
owner was using the ABC to shed liabilities while retaining his or her
equity interest in the firm, the creditor could file an involuntary
petition.209 Creditors in this dataset, however, rarely used this tool.
There were only two such involuntary petitions filed in the dataset, and
the first was dismissed. It is possible, of course, that some creditors
used the threat of involuntary bankruptcy during these ABCs, and the
data collection methodology would not have detected that. Even if that
were the case, the threat of an involuntary bankruptcy may not
necessarily protect the interests of creditors generally. Such a threat
204. D.J. BAKER ET AL., supra note 22, at 277 ("Chapter 11 is now viewed as too slow
and too costly for the majority of middle-market companies to do anything other than sell
its going concern assets in a 363 sale or to simply liquidate the company ... [usually]
almost exclusively for the sole benefit of the secured lender." (alteration in original)
(quoting ASM Field Hearing Before the ABI Comm'n to Study the Reform of Chapter 11, at
2-3 (2013) (written statement of Daniel Dooley))).
205. Id.; see also Lawton, Chapter 11 Triage, supra note 32, at 1016 ("Debtors with
liabilities in excess of $5 million confirm and perform plans at significantly greater rates
than do debtors with liabilities of $5 million or less."); A. Thomas Small, If You Fix It,
They Will Come - A New Playing Field for Small Business Bankruptcies, 79 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 981, 983 (2005) ("Professional fees can make Chapter 11 reorganization prohibitively
expensive for small businesses").
206. See sources cited supra note 204.
207. See Korobkin, supra note 17, at 425.
208. 11 U.S.C. § 303 (2012).
209. See id. § 303(b).
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could in theory inure to the benefit of all unsecured creditors, for
example, if creditors used this threat to force the purchaser to pay more
for the estate assets. But it is just as likely that the purchaser would
simply pay more to the petitioning creditors alone. Thus, assignees and
purchasers might simply "buy off' threatening creditors-benefitting
that creditor but not the estate.
With these two observations about debtor control, this section
considers how bankruptcy law may be amended to give debtors more
control and/or provide greater protection for creditors. These two
options, as discussed below, are not mutually exclusive.
1. Debtor Control
ABCs give an astonishing amount of control to debtors and their
chosen assignees. As discussed in Section V.B.2 above, one might expect
this control to be used to extract value from unsecured creditors,
particularly those unable to adjust the terms of their lending. For
example, assignees could decline to pursue causes of action to recover
preferential and fraudulent transfers; assignees might decline to
challenge the validity of purported security interests; and, most
strikingly, control the sale process that frequently results in an insider
transaction.
Currently, federal bankruptcy law attempts to protect against
debtor control. But these protections come at a cost, and-as long as
ABCs continue to coexist with bankruptcy laws-this cost can be
expected to push business debtors into state law alternatives such as
ABCs. This suggests re-evaluating the benefits of these creditor
protections in small business cases. Many of these protections may
simply impose costs without conferring any benefit on creditors in such
cases. When a large corporation files bankruptcy, it may be expected to
impose serious losses on unsecured and non-adjusting creditors: a
corporation may have significant tort liabilities, environmental
liabilities, and tax liabilities; a corporate bankruptcy may also impose
significant losses on communities, which may have invested heavily in
the way of local tax credits.210 Bankruptcy protections for unsecured
creditors may be particularly important in those cases. But it is not
clear that those protections fit the circumstances of most small business
debtors.
In particular, the findings suggest re-evaluating the benefits of the
absolute priority rule in small business Chapter 11 cases. The absolute
priority rule, as described above, prevents business owners from
210. See Bruckner, The Virtue, supra note 8, at 279-80.
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retaining ownership of their business through bankruptcy unless all
classes of creditors consent or any nonconsenting class is paid in full.211
That rule developed in the 1930s to address a concern that business
owners and their powerful lenders were colluding to wipe out unsecured
debts in bankruptcy.212 The application of that rule to small businesses,
though, is more recent and more controversial.213 The problem, of
course, is that requiring owner-operators to pay the full going concern
value of the business to creditors might render reorganization
impossible.214
The findings reported here show that assignees frequently sold
businesses back to their old owners-exactly the type of transaction the
absolute priority rule in theory prohibits. Those sales could be
interpreted as evidence of debtor-assignee collusion. And it is entirely
plausible that at least some of these sales were collusive. But it is not
likely that most were, especially given that most of these sales were
conducted by professional assignees who face high reputational
constraints. These assignees have a greater incentive to ensure that
assets are properly marketed and sold for the highest value. The fact
that the old owners offered the highest value may suggest that the
assets are worth more in their hands; that is, that the value of these
small businesses lies mostly with the owner-operators.
This suggests that a strict application of the absolute priority rule
in bankruptcy might be value destructive. At the very least, in applying
the rule, courts should preserve the equitable "new value exception" to
the rule, which permits owners to retain equity to the extent they have
contributed new value to the reorganization effort. While the Court has
hinted that this rule may not have survived the enactment of the 1978
Bankruptcy Code, the Court has left open the possibility that new value
may be considered as long as the new value represents the value of
retained equity interest.215 At the most, Congress may consider
eliminating the absolute priority rule for small businesses, as it did
under the old Chapter XI. A middle ground approach, endorsed by the
Commission, would embrace the "Option-Preservation Priority"
211. See supra Part I. See generally John D. Ayer, Rethinking Absolute Priority After
Ahlers, 87 MICH. L. REV. 963, 969-79 (1989) (discussing the history of the absolute
priority rule).
212. Ayer, supra note 211, at 969-79.
213. Id. at 976-77 (noting that the absolute priority rule did not apply to
"compositions" under Chapter XI).
214. Id.
215. See Bank of Am. Nat'l Tr. & Say. Ass'n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P'ship, 526 U.S. 434,
458 (1999) (assuming, without deciding, that the new value exception/corollary survived
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978).
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proposed by Professor Anthony Casey.216
2. Creditor Protection
This Subsection considers two possible ways to amend the
bankruptcy laws to provide better protection for creditors in ABC
proceedings. The first is to make it easier for creditors in an ABC to
obtain bankruptcy court oversight. This would run against the
traditional American aversion to involuntary bankruptcy;217 however,
this expansion would likely be a very minor one since it would apply
only when a debtor had commenced an ABC. Further, the involuntary
petition would be subject to an abstention analysis.218 The second
proposal, a more drastic one, would be to federalize the ABC process, an
idea that had some traction in the 1930s.219
As noted above, there were only two involuntary petitions filed
against the debtors in this dataset. The lack of involuntary petitions
may reflect, once again, the ineffectiveness of bankruptcy law. To the
extent bankruptcy would not sufficiently help creditors, there may be
little incentive to file such petitions. This may also reflect that the costs
of commencing involuntary petitions are too high. For debtors with
fewer than twelve creditors holding "noncontingent, undisputed claims,"
a single creditor with a claim of at least $15,775 may file an involuntary
petition; otherwise, three or more creditors must band together to file
an involuntary petition.220 An involuntary petition, if granted by the
court, would scuttle the state law alternatives; however, a bankruptcy
court may deny the petition or abstain from hearing the case.
221
Because a debtor that has commenced an ABC is presumed insolvent, a
court will deny an involuntary petition only if filed in bad faith. A court
may abstain, though, if it finds that the debtor and creditors would be
better off under the already-commenced ABC.222
216. Casey, supra note 18, at 760.
217. See Kilborn & Walters, supra note 138, at 132.
218. 11 U.S.C. § 305 (2012); see, e.g., In re AMC Inv'rs, L.L.C., 406 B.R. 478, 487-88
(Bankr. D. Del. 2009).
219. See Ayer, supra note 211, at 979-93.
220. 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(1)-(2).
221. Id.; see also id. § 305(a)(1) ("The court, after notice a hearing, may dismiss a case
under this title, or may suspend all proceedings in a case under this title, at any time if--
the interests of creditors and the debtor would be better served by such dismissal or
suspension. . .").
222. 2-305 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY T 305.02 (16th ed., 2009) ("Based on the
legislative history and the conjunctive nature of the statute, some courts have limited the
application of section 305(a)(1) to involuntary bankruptcy cases and devised the following
three-part test for abstention: (i) the petition was filed by a few disgruntled creditors and
184
BETTER THAN BANKRUPTCY?
Bankruptcy law could be amended to make it easier for creditors to
commence involuntary proceedings. Coordination costs could be
eliminated by permitting a single creditor to file an involuntary petition
against a small business. Legal costs could also be reduced by limiting
the liability of the petitioning creditor. For example, instead of making
the petitioning creditor liable for the debtor's legal costs in the event
the court denies the bankruptcy petition, bankruptcy laws could be
amended to impose damages on the petitioning creditor only in the
event of a bad-faith filing.223 These changes, of course, come at a
potential cost of giving creditors too much power over a distressed
debtor. The debtor, in theory, could oppose any petition or request the
court to abstain from any petition. Practically, though, the distressed
debtor may have neither the time nor money to do so. Such fears of
creditors abusing bankruptcy petitions have a long history in U.S.
bankruptcy, but making it easier for creditors to file involuntary
petitions may be a powerful tool to keep state debtor-creditors laws in
check.
Alternatively, a more drastic change would be to federalize ABCs in
order to better protect creditors-a move which had support in the
1930s as a response to concerns about creditors' abuse of involuntary
bankruptcy petitions.224 Such a move now could, in theory, be used to
balance the interests of creditors and debtors alike. In the 1930s, the
National Association of Credit Men supported bringing ABCs under the
purview of bankruptcy laws in order to prevent holdout creditors from
filing involuntary bankruptcy petitions.225 At that point in time,
creditors could commence an involuntary petition if the debtor
committed an "Act[] of Bankruptcy"-which included filing an ABC.226
The Hastings-Michener Bill in 1932 would have allowed assignees to
register a state ABC in the bankruptcy court.227 Creditors then had a
period of time to move the court to replace the assignee with a
most creditors oppose the bankruptcy proceeding; (ii) there is an out-of-court
restructuring in progress; and (iii) the debtor's interests are furthered by dismissal.").
223. See 11 U.S.C. § 301(i) (imposing at least costs and attorney fees on the
unsuccessful petitioning creditor).
224. See Statutory Regulation of Assignments for the Benefit of Creditors, 47 YALE L.J.
944, 946 (1938).
225. Uniform System of Bankruptcy: Joint Hearings on S. 3866 Before the Subcomms.
of the Comms. of the Judiciary, 72d Cong. 449-51 (1932) (statement of Mr. Montgomery,
National Association of Credit Men).
226. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 3, § 3(4), 30 Stat. 544, 547 (defining "Acts of
Bankruptcy" to include "a general assignment for the benefit of his creditors.")
227. S. 3866, 72d Cong. § 74 (1932) (permitting the assignee to file a petition in
bankruptcy, at which point the court would appoint the assignee as trustee).
2016]1 185
186 RUTGERS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:137
trustee.228 If no one so moved, or if the court denied such motion, the
ABC would no longer constitute an act of bankruptcy, which was
important for two reasons.229 First, without an act of bankruptcy,
creditors could not then commence an involuntary proceeding. Second,
this would de-stigmatize ABCs, which might encourage more debtors to
use these proceedings. The motivation for this bill was to protect
debtors from holdout creditors.230 These creditors could sit back during
an assignment proceeding and, if unsatisfied with their distribution,
threaten to commence an involuntary proceeding, thus holding up the
ABC process.231
Today, the fear of involuntary petitions is somewhat ameliorated by
the willingness of courts to abstain from accepting involuntary petitions
when an ABC is already underway. Federalized ABCs, then, would
228. Id. § 74(c) (giving creditors five days after the filing of the ABC to move for the
appointment of a trustee).
229. Id. § 74(d) ("[Tjhe court shall adjudge the debtor a bankrupt (1) upon the
application of parties in interest, if after a hearing upon notice to the debtor and the
trustee the court is satisfied that the debtor has failed to perform any of the duties
required of him by this Act, or (2) if he applied for a discharge and the discharge is
suspended or denied.").
230. Uniform System of Bankruptcy, supra note 223, at 451 (statement of Mr.
Montgomery).
We feel also that the provisions of the Attorney General's bill which are
designed to bring assignments for the benefit of creditors under the protection of
the bankruptcy act are highly desirable. During the last 10 or 15 years business
men, being dissatisfied with the red tape and delay and the inflexibility of
bankruptcy proceedings, have resorted more and more to the handling of cases
out of court.
The out-of-court cases are usually handled by the taking of assignments for
the benefit of creditors, either at common law or under State statutes, or by the
execution of a deed of trust, or as a trust mortgage-the making of such an
instrument is an act of bankruptcy. Where the debtor is honest and there is no
reason why he should be subjected to the stigma of the word 'bankrupt,' it has
been the experience of business men that the affairs of insolvent debts can be
wound up much more quickly, economically, and with much greater profit to
creditors, if the case is kept out of the bankruptcy court; but keeping the case
out of bankruptcy court is fraught with danger, both to the creditors and to the
liquidating officials, under the existing system, because any three creditors with
claims totaling $500 can upset all the good work that has been done by the
assignee or by the creditor's committee, and for purely selfish motives the case
can be thrown into bankruptcy, with no benefit to the creditors.
From the point of view of the creditors themselves, there are decided
disadvantages in out-of-court proceedings, in that preferential transfers can not
be attacked as they can be under the bankruptcy law, nor can the debtor be




provide little protection from creditors; however, it would regularize
ABCs and could provide greater oversight and protection for unsecured
creditors.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article has presented original data on the use of ABCs,
providing the first look at how these procedures work. These findings
illustrate the way that debtors have used state law procedures to obtain
results generally thought to be available only through bankruptcy-and
they have done so without the costs or stigma associated with
bankruptcy. It is certainly possible that states have exceeded their
authority in creating this sort of relief and that, if challenged, such
procedures may be found to be unconstitutional; however, the fact that
debtors are seeking and obtaining bankruptcy-like results under state
law ABCs raises important questions and concerns.
This Article has sought to identify some of those issues and to
layout a research agenda for further study of this field. The outcomes
reported here raise important doctrinal questions about states' ability
to regulate in the field of bankruptcy-an issue that has not received
much attention since the Great Depression era. If states are able to
legislate in this field, this raises policy questions concerning the
potential for a patchwork system of state bankruptcy laws. And finally,
these outcomes also raise questions about how we assess the current
bankruptcy laws. The ability to reorganize under state law might be
expected to attract "healthy" debtors into ABCs, leaving the truly "sick"
debtors to file bankruptcy-an outcome which, if true, might help
explain the lower bankruptcy "success" rates of small business debtors.
Ultimately, the data raise important questions about whether state
law alternatives, such as ABCs, are better than bankruptcy for small
businesses. To the extent one believes that small businesses should
have some sort of tool available to reorganize in the event of financial
distress, then state law alternatives may be superior; after all,
according to many, businesses, federal bankruptcy relief is effectively
unavailable for these debtors. Thus, for the owners, employees, and
trade creditors of small businesses, ABCs may result in superior
outcomes, as these procedures provide an alternative to liquidation. At
the same time, the data reported here highlight potential problems with
the ABC process and raise questions about who bears the costs of these
state "bankruptcy" laws. To that extent, this Article has suggested ways
in which bankruptcy laws may be amended in order to be more like
ABCs, and ways in which the bankruptcy laws may be amended to
shield creditors from potential abuses of the ABC procedures.
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APPENDIX A: MODEL NOTICE OF ASSIGNMENT232
NOTICE OF ASSIGNMENT
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT
OF THE







TO CREDITORS AND OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES:
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on, a petition commencing an
assignment for the benefit of creditors pursuant to chapter 727, Florida
Statutes, made by, assignor, with principal place of business at, to,
assignee, whose address is, was filed on , (year)_.
YOU ARE HEREBY further notified that in order to receive any
dividend in this proceeding you must file a proof of claim with the
assignee or the assignee's attorney on or before (120 days from the date
of the filing of the petition).
ASSIGNEE
Attorney for assignee (if any):
Address:
232. FLA. STAT. § 727.103(1) (2015).
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APPENDIX B: LIST OF ASSIGNORS
Assignor Case County Assignee
Number
ABC Management, Inc. 13-24642 Miami Michael
(LLC) Phelan
Advertising Specialty 12-06940 Broward Michael
Associates, Inc. Phelan
Agrizzi Enterprises 14-015597 Miami Philip Von
Corporation Kahle
Alan W. Smith, Inc. 12-09773 Miami Philip Von
Kahle
Alko Printing, Inc. 14-015783 Miami Philip Von
(Defendant) Kahle
All American Trailer 13-026100 Broward John A. Moffa
Manufacturing, Inc.
American Document 12-016825 Broward Philip Von
Management Group, Kahle
Inc.
Anita Mandal MD PA 12-015703 Palm Michael
Beach Phelan
Arthritis and Back Pain 12-04486 Miami Michael
Centers, Inc. (d/b/a Las Phelan
Clinica de Artritis
a/d/b/a Centros Medicos
Del Dolor y Artritis
aid/b/a Athritis and Pain
Medica Centers)
Associated Air Products, 13-01632 Broward Jonathan
L.C. Satter
Associated Property 13-3222 Broward Jonathan
Management, Inc. Satter
Augello & C, LLC 13-021958 Miami Philip Von
Kahle
Azimuth Unlimited, 12-34004 Broward Michael
LLC Phelan
Ben Stanley LLC (d/b/a 12-31376 Broward Ross Hartog
Sheerbliss Ice Cream)
Brand House, LLC 12-24972 Broward Michael
Phelan
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Brooks Patio Furniture, 12-06945 Miami Michael
Inc. Phelan
Century Building 13-022629 Broward Philip Von
Restoration USA, Inc. Kahle
Dixie Bedding 14-030681 Miami Philip Von
Corporation (d/b/al Dixie Kahle
Bedding Co.)
Electric Beverage 12-02577 Miami Barry
Company, Inc. Mukamal
Engine Rebuilders 14-007985 Broward Maria M. Yip
Warehouse, Inc.
Euromedia Holdings, 14-022265 Miami John A. Moffa
Corp.
F.C.S. Service, Inc. 14-003074 Miami Daniel
(d/b/a Allstate Security Stermer
of Florida)
Financial Credit 13-08014 Broward Michael
Clearing House - 1956 Phelan
Incorporated
Fotobar, LLC 14-010564 Palm Michael
Beach Phelan
Global Engineering 12-40681 Miami Michael
Group Inc Phelan
GM Sales & Marketing 12-33839 Broward Philip Von
LLC Kahle
Gold Coast Hurricane 14-021052 Broward Kenneth A.




Green Bullion Financial 12-19244 Broward Philip Von
Services Kahle
Halas Millwork, Inc. 14-023378 Broward Melissa Davis
Highland Interiors, Inc. 13-021637 Broward John A. Moffa








Corp.; JTN Holdings of
Miami, LLC; EK
Holdings, LLC




Jay S. Mendelsohn, 13-026138 Broward Philip Von
M.D., P.A. (d/bla Kahle
Associates in Physical
Medicine)
Jupiter 4/3 Realty 13-002572 Broward Ronald
Holdings, LLC Goldman
M & R Laundries & Dry 12/23850 Broward Philip Von
Cleaners, Inc. Kahle
Matta Int., Inc. 13-005895 Miami Michael
Phelan
Mediation, Inc. 13-019925 Broward Michael
Phelan
MedidaMetrics, Inc. 14-015891 Miami Joseph J.
Luzinski
Medina's Collections, 13-024366 Miami Michael
Inc. Phelan
MIA Design Group, LLC 14-020287 Miami Daniel
Stermer
Michael's Seafood, Inc. 13-01583 Miami Michael
(d/b/a Michael's Phelan
Gourmet Delicacies)
Military Funding USA, 13-017557 Broward Philip Von
Inc. Kahle
Minimalist Solutions, 14-028949 Miami Daniel
Inc. Stermer
Moll Systems 12-25868 Miami Kenneth A.
Corporation Welt
MR. Prepaid, Inc. 12-18735 Miami Philip Von
Kahle
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Nationwide Metal 12-05392 Miami Michael
Recycling and Phelan
Processing, Inc.
Nebula Glass 12-19376 Broward Michael
International, Inc. Phelan
Nextlife Enterprises, 13-016187 Palm Nicole Testa
LLC Beach Mehdipour
Old Jupiter, LLC 12-005113 Palm Michael
Beach Phelan
Onyx Soft, Inc. 14-16344 Miami James F.
Martin
Pasat Roofing, Inc. 14-015760 Broward Philip Von
Kahle
Pearl Artist & Craft 14-012499 Broward Philip Von
Supply Corp. (d/b/a Kahle
Pearl Arts & Crafts
d/b/a Design Images)
Plastic Surgery 12-22233 Broward Michael
Associates, P.A. Phelan
Precision Packaging, 13-009615 Broward Philip Von
Inc. Kahle
Prodecom International 13-028001 Miami Philip Von
Corp. Kahle
Radiology Corporation 14-002431 Palm Gregg F.
of America Beach Stewart
Ralph Choeff, P.A. (d/b/a 12-08838 Miami Michael
Ralph Choeff Architect Phelan
(pa))
Raquette Sales 12-016493 Palm Seth Heller
International, Inc. Beach
Revdia Corp. 14-009100 Miami Philip Von
Kahle
Ringstar, Inc. 14-013973 Palm Kenneth A.
Beach Welt
Sanare, LLC 14-019878 Broward Philip Von
Kahle
Sandoval, Inc. Palm John A. Moffa
Beach




Shoreline Flooring 14-021372 Broward Philip Von
Supplies 2 of Orlando, Kahle
Inc.
Slonim International, 12-27501 Miami Philip Von
Inc. Kahle
Sobe LX, Inc. 14-021215 Miami Michael
Phelan
South Florida Produce, 12-028184 Broward Michael
LLC Phelan
Structurit, LLC 12-11173 Broward Philip Von
Kahle
Studio Imports, Ltd., 14-018491 Broward Michael
Inc. Phelan
Swimming Pool 13-001930 Palm John H.
Services, Inc. Beach Reynolds
The Law Offices of 13-012848 Broward Michael
Bradley Winston, P.A. Phelan
Thompson Press, Inc. 12-17982 Miami Philip Von
Kahle
Tire Depot Group, LLC 14-017295 Broward Philip Von
(d/bla Tire Depot) Kahle
Traci Communications, 12-011805 Palm John A. Moffa
Inc. Beach
Trans Continental 13-002999 Palm Philip Von
Wholesale, Inc Beach Kahle
UMT International, 14-021389 Broward Philip Von
LLC Kahle
Venafin Financial 14-003509 Miami Michael
Services, LLC Phelan
Viander USA, Inc. 12-43144 Miami Michael
(Defendant) Phelan
Vizcaya by the Sea, Inc. 13-012751 Broward Michael
Phelan
YAK America, Inc. 12-37372 Palm KENNETH A.
Beach WELT
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